


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28 September 1994



**FOREIGN
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JPRS Report

Central Eurasia

Military Affairs

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Central Eurasia

Military Affairs

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ARMED FORCES

Crimes Decreasing, Discipline Problems Continue

94UM0595A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
23 Sep 94 p 1

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Anatoliy Dokuchayev: "The Number of Crimes in the Army Is Decreasing. But Discipline Remains an Urgent Problem"]

[Text] The Russian Armed Forces are increasingly acquiring a new look—the look of the armed forces of a democratic state. Military reform, the second stage of which has entered its concluding phase, is promoting not only the improvement of the structure of the Army and Navy and the increase of combat readiness of units and formations, but it is also increasing the level of legal and social protection of servicemen and is strengthening legality, law and order, and military discipline.

The General Staff Troop Regime and Service Directorate recently summed up the results of military command organs' work and activities to strengthen law and order and discipline in the troops during the first six months of this year. The results are encouraging. Let's turn to the figures in the directions which are the topic of special attention of the Armed Forces leadership. First of all we must point out that on the whole 18 percent fewer servicemen died in contrast to the same period in 1993. That is an extremely important result.

Of course, it is distressing and painful to discuss the deaths of people in numbers and percentages but we have a need to do that. And yet the fact that fewer people are dying inspires optimism. It is obviously impossible to avoid this sad statistic, that's life and, by way of illustration, 1,200 people died in the U.S. Army and 1,359 in the Russian Armed Forces in 1993.

The number of crimes and incidents decreased by 28 percent, including crimes associated with derision and harassment—by 12 percent, crimes associated with evasion of military service—by 35 percent and, servicemen's crimes against the local population—by 30 percent.

Substantially fewer servicemen are stealing weapons in the Army—60 percent fewer.

"All of this became possible largely thanks to the organizational work of the military command organs and to the strengthening of legal work in the Army and Navy," General Staff Troop Regime and Service Directorate Chief Lieutenant-General Valentin Bogdanchikov said in an interview. "I must note that this year for the first time the Minister of Defense elaborated and approved a plan of primary measures to maintain law and order and military discipline in the Armed Forces which permitted us to better coordinate the activities of the main and central directorates. However, the Ministry of Defense leadership thinks that not all military command organs

are aggressively involved in this matter and it is taking steps to further improve military legal work and to strengthen law and order and military discipline.

What kind of steps are these? Troop Regime and Service Directorate personnel cited several problems which must be solved. First of all attention will be paid to the cadres who would impart dynamism to legal work. Today commanders conduct it—due to their training. There are deputy commanders for legal work and legal services officers but these specialties are only 20 percent manned. There are socio-legal affairs officers in the educational structures. They, as a rule, do not have a legal education and there are few of them in the authorized manning structure. Of course, there are unauthorized organs in the troops: military investigators, people's assessors, courts of honor, and unauthorized legal services under the Officers Clubs. These organs were created far from everywhere and they are frequently ineffective.

The General Staff thinks that work to strengthen law and order and military discipline must begin with legal training of command cadres of all levels and of legal services specialists. Specifically, in the next few months they propose developing a unified document for legal work which would impart a systematic nature to this extremely important process. The scientific potential of military VUZ's [higher educational institutions] will be set into motion to arm commanders with new work methods for strengthening legality and law and order. The "Management of Everyday Troop Activities in Peacetime and Troop Service" course will be more broadly introduced into the programs of the military academies and schools. They envision a buildup of educational-methodological facilities to teach the issues of troop service and military discipline to the appropriate officials. So, next year they propose organizing the training of troop service officers at "Vystrel" Higher Officers Courses and in a department of the Armed Forces Humanities Academy. They plan to conduct a number of other major measures.

Closer work with law enforcement organs and cooperation with military commissariats and the enterprises and organizations where conscripts and contract servicemen previously worked, employment services and housing management offices is becoming a very important direction to strengthen law and order and to increase military discipline. What are we talking about? They are being tasked to begin legal work with a serviceman, whether he is a conscript or a contract serviceman, from the first day of his arrival at the military unit. This is extremely important.

Today, as we all know, pre-draft age and draft-age citizens are committing more than half of the crimes in the country. And these people are ending up in the Army. So, up to 40 percent of the conscripts who enter military construction units have prior convictions. They commit 65 percent of all crimes against the local population. Of course, we will not take people with

these kinds of biographies into the professional ranks, that's why there is a candidate selection process for military service. But what about the soldiers who have been drafted? They are not being selected. Moreover, this contingent will not improve in the near future. Therefore, we need to be prepared to work with so-called non-law-abiding citizens.

Here we have cited only several directions where military legal work with the troops is being stepped up. There certainly are more. Military command organs of all levels are becoming involved in the process. It's obvious that a unified organ (subunit) is needed in the military department to coordinate their activities. The General Staff Troop Regime and Service Directorate is confidently acting in this capacity. Many experts note that there is a need to transform it into the Troop Service and Military Discipline Directorate which would better correspond to its primary mission. And the main thing—troop service and military discipline departments (sections) in the troops and in the fleets that unite approximately 1,000 officers who would operate more effectively under its systematic leadership.

In conclusion, I would like to say the following. Not waiting for the Military-Legal Reform in the Armed Forces Concept "to be implemented", the draft of which was submitted for discussion a month and a half ago, the military department is increasing the level of legal work and efforts to strengthen law and order and military discipline. And we have become convinced that they are producing results. And this is important not only for those who are involved with this problem because of their duties, but, also, as the letters to the editors indicate, for the primary mass of our fellow citizens. Because in reality our brothers, sons and grandsons are serving in the Army and in the Navy.

STRATEGIC DETERRENT FORCES

Rear Adm Ovcharenko on Prospects for Naval Strategic Nuclear Forces

944F1500A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 6 Sep 94 p 5

[Article by Rear Admiral Aleksey Mikhaylovich Ovcharenko, deputy chief of Main Naval Staff Operations Directorate, under rubric "Ideas and People: The Army": "Prospects for Russian Naval Strategic Nuclear Forces"]

[Text] From NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA dossier:

Rear Admiral Aleksey Mikhaylovich Ovcharenko is deputy chief of the Main Naval Staff Operations Directorate. After completing Pacific Higher Naval School in 1966, he served for 15 years aboard missile-armed submarines of the Pacific and Northern fleets. He has served on the General Staff and Main Naval Staff since 1981. He was a member of the working group for preparations for signing the START I and START II treaties.

A Clear Gap

After the START II Treaty was signed in January 1993, the mass media regularly began publishing articles both in defense of as well as against this Treaty. One point in the polemics probably did not go unnoticed for the reader who is perspicacious enough and has certain ideas as to motives driving particular articles. As a rule, the fate only of one component of Russia's strategic nuclear forces, the Strategic Missile Troops, comes under discussion with a varying level of argumentation (depending on the authors' preparedness or conscientiousness), but the state of affairs and further prospects in the naval strategic nuclear forces (not to mention strategic aviation, about which it is declared that Russia essentially has none) remain in the shadows.

With this article I would like to fill in the existing gap if only to a small extent and inform the reader of those problems presently troubling the Navy.

A Little History

The creation of naval strategic nuclear forces as a combat-effective strategic system in the USSR dates back to the mid-1960's and early 1970's, when 34 first-generation Design Project 667a missile-armed submarines (Navaga, according to START I terminology) were built and transferred to the Navy over a ten year period (from 1964 through 1974). The low specifications and performance characteristics of ballistic missiles accommodated in them (16 with a range of 2,500-3,000 km and an accuracy to 3 km) determined the operational principles in employing these submarines. As a rule, they patrolled in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans within missile range of assigned targets on territory of the probable enemy. This military term presently is criticized as a cold war relic, but do not forget that at that time the U.S. Navy order of battle also had around 40 missile-armed submarines (at least half of which were constantly on combat patrol at sea) with Polaris missiles aimed at our cities. The constant presence at sea of 12-15 USSR Navy missile-armed submarines with a short missile approach time radically changed the picture of nuclear confrontation.

To lessen the threat to their territories which indeed had arisen from ocean sectors, navy commands, above all of the United States and England, were forced to urgently develop and realize several very sophisticated naval programs. Above all one must note the solution to a "national problem" (along with the "national" program of a U.S. astronaut's flight to the Moon)—creation of SOSUS, a global system for sonar detection of USSR Navy submarines, which cost U.S. taxpayers tens of billions of dollars. An entire ASW system was created in the Atlantic and Pacific, which included all ASW forces and assets joined by a unified command and possessing sufficient effectiveness in combating USSR Navy nuclear and diesel powered submarines.

But the situation in the rivalry at sea, especially in parrying the nuclear missile threat from USSR naval strategic nuclear forces, changed fundamentally for leading NATO countries already by the early 1970's, when our scientists from a design bureau under the leadership of V. P. Makeyev developed a new missile system with an intercontinental range of fire (8,000-9,000 km) and a powerful single warhead and it became operational in missile-armed submarines. Subsequent generations of Murena-Class and Murena-M-Class missile submarines were armed with this system. (It is not out of place to recall that the U.S. Trident I missile with an intercontinental range of fire appeared only in the late 1970's.) Now there was no need for USSR submarines to patrol near shores of potential enemies, exposed to the danger of being destroyed even before launching their missiles. Combat missions also were accomplished successfully from seas and water areas adjoining our coast, where naval forces had an opportunity to give them reliable protection. In addition, command and control of groupings of naval strategic nuclear forces was simplified and the communication of all commands to missile-armed submarines was guaranteed.

One singular detail must be noted. Right from the very beginning of creation of naval strategic nuclear forces, the U.S. leadership has given them priority compared with ICBM's and strategic aviation. Thus, submarines armed with Polaris A-3 missiles with three individually targetable warheads already began to be built for the U.S. Navy in 1961 and became operational beginning in 1964. Prior to the end of 1977 all U.S. Navy missile submarines were up-armed with Poseidon C-3 missiles with 14 warheads (a total of around 7,000 warheads, approximately 65 percent of the entire strategic nuclear potential). Similar Kalmar-Class submarines appeared in the USSR Navy only by 1976, but even then they were armed with missiles with only three warheads, so to say that the USSR was the initiator of the arms race at sea at that time would not be quite correct.

The USSR had built a total of over 80 nuclear powered missile-armed submarines up to 1990, including a series of six Design Project 941 submarines of the Tayfun system (20 missiles each, with a range of fire around 10,000 km and with ten warheads) and seven Delfin missile-armed submarines (Design Project 667 bdrn). The Soviet Union stopped building nuclear powered missile-armed submarines at the end of 1990, and the Russian Federation, as the successor to the USSR, also is not engaged in such construction at the present time.

Thus, by the time the START I Treaty was concluded, powerful naval strategic nuclear forces had been created in the Navy, including 62 missile-armed submarines with 940 launchers for ballistic missiles carrying 2,804 nuclear warheads, which was 28 percent of the launchers and 27 percent of the warheads existing in the strategic nuclear forces as a whole. In skilled hands, this powerful means is capable of reliably ensuring protection of Russia's national interests on a global scale.

START I and START II Treaties and Prospects for Naval

Strategic Nuclear Forces With Their Implementation

It is known that understandings reached under START I placed certain restrictions only on the overall number of deployed nuclear weapon platforms (up to 1,600) and warheads on them (up to 6,000). With respect to determining the future appearance of naval strategic nuclear forces, both parties were free to make decisions on this matter, since only the overall number of warheads deployed on ICBM's and SLBM's was restricted (up to 4,900).

The optimum version of START I Treaty implementation for the Navy was the one that takes into account above all our capabilities for maintaining the necessary level of combat readiness of naval strategic nuclear forces with minimum costs. The service life of missile-armed submarines is the determining factor here. Since the established operational life of submarines with single-warhead missiles (35) expires by 1998-1999 (by the end of the seven-year period of START I reductions), this factor alone determined the maximum number of submarines which realistically could remain as part of the naval strategic nuclear forces—no more than 27. In this case they would have 456 launchers with 2,320 nuclear warheads. The Navy's proportion would be preserved at the existing level for platforms and it would grow to 38 percent for warheads.

This was the logical and most acceptable option for reducing naval strategic nuclear forces from the standpoint of the cost of its fulfillment. But the General Staff "corrected" the economic calculations somewhat and specified a warhead level for the Navy of approximately 1,750, based on the need to preserve the necessary makeup of Missile Troops. Therefore signing of the START II Treaty did not require the Navy to make any fundamental changes in plans developed for reducing naval strategic nuclear forces, but the U.S. Navy was forced to cut the number of warheads on its missile-armed submarines practically in half compared with the level specified by the START I Treaty.

After the familiar events of 1991 and disintegration of the Soviet Union, it was no longer calculations of the General Staff and Ministry of Defense military institutes that began to determine prospects for development of naval strategic nuclear forces as well as those for the country's strategic nuclear forces as a whole, but events of a political, economic, and purely financial nature. I would like to note that presently only four of the most developed world powers—Russia, the United States, Great Britain and France—can permit themselves to have naval strategic nuclear forces. China, which possesses capabilities unlimited by anything (except economic considerations) for concentrating efforts on specific directions of military organizational development under the present political system, is only beginning to

create them. The cost of building one Ohio-Class submarine armed with Trident missiles approaches one billion dollars, and one missile for her costs around 40 million dollars. Considering the new economic relations taking shape in Russia, prices on military products in our country inevitably will become commensurable with world prices.

Still, both the United States and Great Britain together with France chose to develop and upgrade specifically naval strategic nuclear forces as the priority direction in developing strategic arms for the long term. Why? We will attempt to answer this question without delving deep into its theory.

First of all, it is in view of the high survivability of naval strategic nuclear forces. Possible combat patrol areas of missile-armed submarines comprise tens of millions of square kilometers unrestricted for now by any treaties. In just one or two hours after a submarine dives beneath the water, the area of her possible location can be tens of thousands of square kilometers. In 24 hours this area will be commensurable with that of the Sea of Japan, Sea of Okhotsk or Barents Sea contiguous with Russian territory. Bearing in mind that under treaty restrictions Topol mobile ICBM launchers can be located only in limited position areas and that the location of fixed silo launchers is known with an accuracy to a few meters, the thesis propagandized by certain former and present military scientists that these ICBM's have higher survivability compared with nuclear powered missile-armed submarines generates perplexity. An unbiased analysis shows that it is not that difficult to determine the exact location of a specific mobile launcher with a reliable, functioning system of space and other kinds of reconnaissance. And the logic of modern war is unequivocal and simple: detected means destroyed. It is possible to cite presently unclassified data about the experience of lengthy tracking of each other's missile-armed submarines by the U.S. and USSR navies as confirmation of the sufficient difficulty of the mission of combating naval strategic nuclear forces. Of 9-11 U.S. missile-armed submarines in the Atlantic in 1988, we were able to detect only two in the course of a 10-15 day operation, and that tracking was accomplished only episodically and without proper opposition. Attempts by U.S. nuclear powered submarines to carry out lengthy covert tracking of our missile-armed submarines also had no success and at times led to collisions, as was the case in the Barents Sea in March 1993. And this with all the ballyhoo and publicity about U.S. technology and the level of training of U.S. submariners, and also considering it was peacetime! In wartime not one submarine of a potential enemy will be able to operate for a lengthy time in areas of vital importance for our missile-armed submarines—she simply inevitably will be destroyed. One can argue about loss figures, which is fully permissible in polemics, but it is impermissible to draw unequivocal conclusions based on long-obsolete initial data—mistakes are unavoidable.

Secondly, it is necessary to dwell on one other unquestionably important aspect of development of components of the country's strategic nuclear forces. ICBM's with any method of basing (in silos, mobile) always will be a tempting target for forces and assets of a potential enemy. The ICBM grouping always will attract similar and other weapons. Even without considering a hypothetical nuclear strike, it is necessary to speak frankly about those serious consequences which may exist for Russia's territory, economy and population with any combat effect on ICBM's (especially of the Topol type) and on their nuclear warhead storage areas. Not one responsible person can exclude the possibility of such an effect. Specialists know, and the uninitiated person can imagine, what efforts must be spent to ensure a sufficient degree of protection for a Topol missile system moving along forest or steppe roads, even against one raiding party. It is impossible to count simply on the fact that it is very far to the border; an entire set of measures is needed. In terms of people alone, it is necessary to have many tens of times more just for security and defense of one mobile missile system than the number of people operating this same system. Any combat effect, even an accident (which has happened repeatedly during the time mobile missile systems have been operated), may lead to serious ecologic consequences. And even calculations cited by L. Volkov (newspaper SEGODNYA, No 101) to the effect that the likelihood of a mobile launcher accident is 0.00001 in a year indicate nothing, since they are not confirmed by any independent expert and the predetermined nature of calculations by departmental military (and not only military) institutes is well-known. Even this is fully enough for those people who end up within the effect radius of this "one one-hundred thousandth." And the thesis that creation of a road network in mobile missile system basing areas is supported by the local administration is very dubious. When local residents regularly see this Topol under their windows and have a clear idea about what will happen to them in case of an accident, they will quickly replace this "local administration." By the way, one of the most important motives for the U.S. administration to reject any exotic method of mobile basing of MX and Midgetman missiles specifically was the fact of an active fight by the population and local administration of those areas where their deployment was planned.

It is quite a different situation with nuclear powered missile-armed submarines. First of all, they number from single units (for Great Britain and France) to several dozen (Russia and the United States). They are based not in densely populated areas in the center of the country, but on the outskirts. For Russia this is the most significant thing, since it must be said frankly that development both of the Murmansk coast and of Kamchatka occurred above all specifically to solve problems of defense, and no less than 90 percent of it was accomplished by the military. Even now, when structures have begun to appear which are ready to engage in conversion of the Navy infrastructure, the talk for now is

about the largest bases in Vladivostok and in the Murmansk area. But no one except the military is capable of continuing the development of so-called "remote military places." The very departure of a nuclear powered missile-armed submarine from base and her transit to the dive area takes only a few hours, and after she disappears beneath the water the problem of combating her acquires a probabilistic nature. Even the loss of a nuclear powered submarine in the ocean essentially will not generate any consequences for her own territory. Five nuclear powered submarines presently rest on the ocean bottom, lost to accidents by submarine forces of the United States (Thresher and Scorpion) and USSR (K-219, K-8 and Komsomolets). The world presently remembers something about the accident on Komsomolets, but probably only naval specialists know about the rest. But the entire world knows about and remembers accidents at atomic electric power stations, especially Chernobyl. The fact is, though, that the power of nuclear reactors resting on the ocean floor is fully commensurable with that of the fourth unit of the Chernobyl Atomic Electric Power Station. The consequences are quite different.

Thirdly, up to the present time the assertion exists (taken from who knows where) even among some Ministry of Defense specialists that the relative cost of maintaining naval strategic nuclear forces is enormously higher than that of ICBM's. Let us see whether or not this is unequivocally so. It is indisputable if we figure the cost of one missile-armed submarine and one mobile missile system, but a nuclear potential of 200 warheads is accommodated on one Tayfun missile-armed submarine. Evidently the cost of deploying a similar ICBM grouping still will be considerably greater than building a missile-armed submarine. In addition, the number of personnel in the naval strategic nuclear forces at the present time is an order of magnitude lower than in the Strategic Missile Troops. Expenditures for maintaining combat readiness of naval strategic nuclear forces are no more than 25 percent of those for the Navy, i.e., a minimum of four times less than is spent on ICBM's. And even such a generalized indicator as "cost of a delivered warhead" is essentially commensurable in the Strategic Missile Troops and naval strategic nuclear forces.

By the end of the century the U.S. Navy most likely will have no more than 18 missile-armed submarines in its order of battle. Russia's naval strategic nuclear forces will have approximately just as many even without considering the need for implementing the START II Treaty. Naturally, expenses for their upkeep also will decrease.

Finally, on the question of the difficulty of command and control of naval strategic forces. Of course, theoretically a launch signal can be communicated to an ICBM launcher with higher probability and more reliably than to a submarine located deep beneath the water. But again one can argue the figures. The fact is, all nuclear powers

presently are unified in assessing the importance of nuclear weapons not as battlefield weapons, but as a reliable means of deterring any possible aggression. The fact is, even if all but one enemy missile-armed submarines were destroyed, even then the likelihood of receiving inevitable nuclear retaliation will keep you from an insane step.

Therefore what is deciding is the very fact of missile-armed submarines being at sea and not high or low reliability of command and control of them. Herein lies the most important deterrent principle of the existence of any country's naval strategic nuclear forces.

With consideration of all this, the position of leading world countries which have placed reliance on naval strategic nuclear forces in developing their strategic nuclear forces becomes clearer and more understandable to an unbiased person who is unburdened by departmental interests, but who is anxious over questions of national security. In practice this means that these countries' leaders showed genuine concern for the safety of their fellow citizens by having protected them against nuclear danger to the maximum extent.

Much more can be said about the need for further maintaining combat readiness of the country's naval strategic nuclear forces, but—and this must be stressed—the Russian leadership already has made the political decisions which have put everything in its place. It is the START II Treaty, which gives unquestionable priority to the development of naval strategic nuclear forces. In fact, by 2003 around 60 percent of Russia's entire strategic nuclear potential may be accommodated in missile-armed submarines. Naval strategic nuclear forces must become in fact a powerful stabilizing factor in international relations.

But it must be said frankly that up to the present time there has been no real, practical realization of the political decision to cardinal change the structure of the country's strategic nuclear forces. Russian President Boris Yeltsin's assignments on this matter are not being carried out, nor can they be when the Navy is allocated less than half of necessary financial resources. We speak of the priority of naval strategic nuclear forces, but in practice we are solving the problems of Missile Troops with a grouping of Topol mobile missile systems. Many senior officials of the Ministry of Defense and General Staff consider the financing of this system an obvious priority! And they lose sight of the circumstance that if urgent steps are not taken, a critical situation involving maintenance of necessary readiness of the Tayfun strategic naval system may form in just the next few years. It is proposed to charge the Navy itself with solving this problem, almost according to the principle: you need it, you solve it. And this is a matter of state importance!

With consideration of Russia's very serious economic situation, the question is even more acute as to how to ensure a cardinal change in the very structure of the country's strategic nuclear forces in the next ten years

with minimum expenditures, for this will require trillions on trillions, which are so needed by our people in the present difficult time.

It must be frankly admitted here that this is impossible to do within the framework of decisions already made, but there is a solution, and it is to achieve new political understandings with nuclear powers, and with the United States of America to begin with. It is fully logical to come to an agreement on further lowering the levels of strategic arms by a minimum of twofold. The presence of 1,500-1,800 strategic nuclear weapons for Russia and the United States will fully ensure nuclear deterrence. That version would allow rejecting the development of a number of costly offensive systems and working for the long term. It would be possible to devote sufficient attention to increasing the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence by upgrading systems for missile attack warning, battle management and logistic support. What is the use in having several hundred SLBM launchers if they are constantly in base? Missile-armed submarines are a realistic means of nuclear deterrence only when they are at sea beneath the water.

START II Treaty and Russia's Naval Strategic Nuclear Forces

One must have the courage to admit that Russia is incapable of maintaining the strategic nuclear forces which the USSR could allow itself, especially now under conditions of new economic relations. The cost of military products is growing and very soon will reach the world level, but our gross national product is incommensurable with this indicator for the United States. This in itself determines the need both for further strategic offensive arms reductions and the most rapid entry into force of the START I and II treaties. Live within your means, as they say, but even here one must understand clearly that it was costly to arm, and disarmament will cost no less.

A foundation now is being laid in Russia for building Strategic Nuclear Forces of the 21st century. All prospects in the Missile Troops are known—they are the Topol missile system and its modifications in various basing options. The problem is enormously more acute in naval strategic nuclear forces, because realistic time periods for creating a new missile system and submarine for carrying it are around ten years. If we were to begin such work today, the first combat-ready ship would be received only in 2005, i.e., the break in introducing new strategic systems to the Navy order of battle already would be 15 years. The experience of world submarine building shows that the most economical path is a process of continuous construction of combatant ships with a transition to output of increasingly sophisticated systems. That is why it is so vital to the Navy that people on whom decisionmaking depends in questions of state importance also see the problems of Russia's naval strategic nuclear forces behind the fence of Topols.

Conclusion

The end of bloc confrontation and the process of establishing Russia's new relations above all with NATO countries also led to certain changes in the area of naval activity. The number of missile-armed submarines patrolling at sea decreased. While just 5-6 years ago NATO countries and the USSR were constantly keeping up to 20-22 missile-armed submarines at sea and in bases in a high degree of readiness for launching missiles, now the number is 12-14.

But there is a large number of questions at a state level whose resolution cannot be postponed.

Above all it is necessary to discuss and adopt a national program for developing the Strategic Nuclear Forces. Principles of nuclear policy should not be developed by the Ministry of Defense, let alone by the Navy or Missile Troops. This is a matter of the highest national order. The military should be brought in as developers, experts and working group members, but the decision must be made by supreme legislative bodies. These questions already have been set forth in part in recently adopted basic provisions of Russian Federation military doctrine. But the views of all nuclear countries on problems of nuclear weapon employment are not just a military problem and internal affair of each country. These questions are to a greater degree political and concern all world civilization. All world countries should clearly picture Russia's position on this problem. We should announce to the whole world that any effect (combat effect or by special means) on our strategic systems is impermissible. In the future, when Russia is left with no more than 10-15 missile-armed submarines, a threat to our national interests will arise even in case there is a threat of the loss of just one of them. Any effect on systems (antimissile surveillance, battle management and so on) supporting the functioning of the Strategic Nuclear Forces also has to be considered. Only with such a clear, precise position will Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces really perform their role as the main factor deterring the initiation of aggression against the Russian Federation.

GROUND TROOPS

Chief of Missile-Artillery Directorate on Impact of Budget

*MM2109110694 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 17 Sep 94 p 5*

["Topical Interview" with Colonel-General N.I. Karaulov, chief of the Russian Defense Ministry Main Missile and Artillery Directorate, by Aleksandr Yegorov; date, place not given: "The State Order Exists and Will, I Hope, Continue To Do So"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Yegorov] Nikolay Ivanovich, could you name some categories of arms whose production and supply you organize?

[Karaulov] Primarily short-range missile complexes, air defense missile systems, medium-, short-range, and close-support systems, antitank and tank missile systems, missiles and warheads. It is a question of artillery armaments including towed and self-propelled ground-based and air defense artillery guns and multiple launch rocket systems; small arms and close-in combat weapons; ammunition for artillery and small arms; armaments for armored vehicles and airborne troops; military instruments including electro-optical, television, and infrared; radio-technical systems and radar arms. We handle automated weapon and troop command and control systems, mobile systems for the repair, inspection, maintenance, adjustment, and technical servicing of arms, as well as technological equipment for the repair and commissioning of arms and munitions, spare parts and tools, materials for their storage and use, repair and other documentation, and so on and so forth. A long list.

[Yegorov] A major apparatus is needed to manage such multifaceted activity. Yet cutbacks are taking place in the Army one after another. How do you escape from the situation?

[Karaulov] There is indeed a shortage of people. But let us not forget that the GRAU [Defense Ministry Main Missile and Artillery Directorate] has under its jurisdiction research institutes, design bureaus, test ranges, arsenals, bases, dumps, and military training establishments, as well as military missions in industrial organizations. Moreover, by the nature of their special activity rocket and artillery services in military districts, armies, and army corps come under our jurisdiction. That is, there are enough forces to successfully direct the system of providing the troops with missile-technical and artillery-technical support.

[Yegorov] The 1994 budget envisaged a 60-percent cut in defense spending compared with last year. What effect has this had on the development and production of arms and on units' combat readiness? And, in your view, is a State Defense Order necessary with this level of funding?

[Karaulov] I can say one thing on this score: The State Defense Order exists today and will, I hope, continue to do so. Whether it ensures that the Russian Federation Armed Forces' supply of modern arms is maintained at an adequate level is a very difficult question, one that requires special consideration. That is why I do not want to talk about it in passing. But, as for appropriations for the GRAU, we received half the planned amount of money. And that is of course bound to affect the situation as regards arms development and procurement. In order to ensure that these consequences are less painful we have formulated a definite strategy, and in these conditions we are trying to preserve the scientific and technical schools, the research institutes, the design bureaus, and the unique technologies for the development and production of rocket and artillery arms. We realize what their loss would mean for our country, to wit colossal expenditure on reviving them at best.

We could work more effectively in this direction were defense production to have the appropriate legislative-legal base. We urgently need laws on defense enterprises and their social base, on the defense order, etc. They are what should clearly regulate relations between participants in defense production, including customers, their mutual obligations, rights, and duties. I think that today only laws can transform the defense order from an "obligation" into something profitable, and, therefore, so desirable that people fight for it, and work at defense sectors regains its prestige.

[Yegorov] But at the moment most defense enterprise directors complain about the uncertainty of their position: No orders are being placed, yet they are not, they say, being "set free." Are you now parting with so many firms, plants, and research institutes?

[Karaulov] The GRAU conducted a comprehensive assessment of the range of rocket and artillery arms and their combat capabilities earlier in connection with the reduction in funding. We looked into standardizing models and making them interchangeable in performing different combat tasks. This made it possible to decide on a list of arms that largely preserves the prevailing system of production and troop support. Considering that our defense enterprises often have the monopoly in the production and development of a specific armament, they have not left the defense complex wholesale—the defense order has just become a smaller proportion of overall output. In some cases a number of enterprises have indeed abandoned defense production. But that is due not to their desire to break "free" but to the lack of return on producing small unprofitable quantities to meet the state order.

[Yegorov] If I hear where you are coming from, a move to determine the top-priority weapons—those weapons whose production cannot be suspended without loss to the country's defense capability—is behind the comprehensive assessment of the range of rocket and artillery arms. What systems are we talking about and why have they specifically been given preference?

[Karaulov] The top-priority weapons include high-efficiency weapons, reconnaissance facilities, and guidance systems with high combat capabilities and scope for modernization. These rocket and artillery arms are already known to the public at large. They have been repeatedly demonstrated at arms exhibitions both in Russia and abroad.

They primarily comprise air defense systems, namely our S-300V mobile antiaircraft missile system, widely renowned among specialists worldwide. In terms of its combat specifications and maneuverability, it is considerably superior to its foreign counterpart (the U.S. Patriot system). The S-300V is capable of hitting a wide range of airborne targets with great efficiency, including tactical aircraft and tactical, operational-tactical, and air-launched ballistic missiles. All target acquisition operations are fully automated.

There is the Zoopark-1 radar complex for reconnoitering missile and artillery positions. All its reconnaissance processes are also fully automated, making it possible to boost the system's efficiency compared with previous models by a factor of three to five.

The priorities include the 300mm "Smerch" salvo-fire missile system designed to destroy weapons and radioelectronic systems, light armored and nonarmored vehicles, control posts, and troops as well as aircraft and helicopters on landing strips and in the flight line, as well as other important installations in the tactical rear of the enemy's combat disposition. The feature distinguishing the "Smerch" salvo-fire missile system from its foreign counterparts is the existence of a rocket projectile guidance system ensuring enhanced consistency and accuracy of fire.

Last, I would mention the 120mm Nona-SVK self-propelled gun. The gun is designed to attack troops stationed in the open or under cover as well as weapons, command and observation posts, and armored installations. The gun's special feature is its ability to fire both high-explosive fragmentation shells, including rocket-assisted projectiles, and mortars. Foreign 120mm mortar shells can be used as well. The gun is unparalleled anywhere in the world.

Officer Claims 'Green Berets' at Totsk

944F1465A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 31 Aug 94 p 1

[Report by Vadim Yegorov under the rubric "Details": "'Green Berets' Will Secretly Visit Russia: On the Command and Staff Exercise at Totsk Training Grounds"]

[Text] A high-ranking officer of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Russian Federation Armed Forces' General Staff told NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent some details regarding the composition of the American military contingent arriving at Totsk training grounds to participate in joint command and staff exercises. According to him, among the 250 military servicemen of the U.S. Army's 3rd Infantry Division will be members of special operations forces, whose command and headquarters are located in Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

Among the special forces' combat units, there is a special purpose group (the so-called "green berets"), whose regional orientation envisages direct conduct of operations on the territory of Russia both during the period of threat and with the beginning of potential military engagement between NATO's joint armed forces and the Russian military. The following activities belong exclusively within the competence of "green berets": strategic military intelligence; electronic espionage; raid operations deep into the enemy rear; sabotage of power generation, transportation, and communications facilities; combat guerrilla operations; support of nationalist underground; seizure and elimination of missile systems at forward positions.

In the course of the exercises, under the cover of the 3rd Infantry Division, American spetsnaz officers will conduct reconnaissance on the Totsk Training Grounds within the zone of their operational responsibility, will fine-tune the methods of "radioelectronic" intelligence in finding Russian troops' field communication centers, as well as test in practice the conceptual planks of using U.S. special forces in a combat situation in Russia.

AIR, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

Journalist's Reflections on Achievements of Emba Test Range

MM2609132594 Moscow TV-6 Moskva Television
in Russian 1030 GMT 11 Sep 94 (Tentative)

[From the "Military TV" program: Video feature on the Emba-5 test range in Kazakhstan, footage attributed to "Voyen TV"]

[Excerpts] [Video of test firing, bird flying above test range, lizard in the sand, mobile anti-aircraft missile system, airborne helicopter, radar aerials, "Emba-5" sign, flagpoles—over music]

[Unidentified correspondent] "Emba"—this exotic name is known perhaps only to geography specialists, and even they know it only as the name of a small river in the north of Kazakhstan. Until recently only people directly involved in the development and testing of surface-to-air missile systems for the Ground Troops' Air Defense Forces knew about a test range of this name. Now that the test range is no longer secret, we can tell you what people do here and how they live. And having learned this, you may be able to understand, for example, why exports of Russian weapons have declined by a factor of four since 1990.

As regards the level of interest displayed by foreign intelligence services, any square meter of this desert scorched by the sun and gunfire has few rivals in the world. Even now foreign spy satellites constantly hover overhead. It is amazing. The USSR has collapsed, bringing down the Berlin Wall and simultaneously triggering the breakup of the camp of the socialist commonwealth countries. The missiles of recent potential enemies have been retargeted to point into space. And finally, joint international military operations are nothing unusual now. Yet satellites still hover above Emba. It is as if the owners of these satellites cannot forgive the test range for the triumph of the weapons built here. Let us recall the international arms fair in Abu Dhabi where our surface-to-air missile launches met with spontaneous loud applause. [video shows arms fair footage] Since that time no one any longer doubts the competitiveness of Russian weapons. Incidentally, those who live and work here under the continuous rumble of missiles heading to meet their targets rarely think about the farflung mysterious countries of the Near East with

their petrodollars. War is no fireworks display, a front-line poet once wrote, it is very hard work. Sending missiles to the skies is also hard work, especially here, and especially now.

It all began more than 30 years ago, when 16 August 1958 the Air Defense Forces were set up in the USSR. At the same time the decision to build a special test range was adopted. The site was chosen carefully, on the basis of the principle "the worse, the better." This is understandable. Weapons have to be tested in the most extreme of conditions. Just like here, in this realm of sands, rocks, and salt marshes. In the summer the temperature rises to 40 degrees—it is very dusty and the heat is stifling. And in the winter the temperature drops to minus 40 degrees.

[Unidentified soldier] Here at Emba every three days you get clouds like these...

[Correspondent] And a scorching wind. So that this is not a cushy posting, to put it mildly.

Construction of the test range was carried out in record time. Soon afterward young designers arrived here whose inventions were subsequently responsible for the glory of our surface-to-air missile weapons—Academicians Yefremov, Nepobedimyy, Nudelman. Here at Emba their first missiles were launched at targets. And they are still working here. Here are their creations from those years. [video shows a range of missile systems] How many bold, unorthodox technical solutions went into these shapes and outlines.

[Nikolay Falev, deputy commander of Ground Troops' Air Defense Forces, identified by caption] In the early sixties aircraft of the potential enemy underwent rapid development. The trends in their development forced our chief designers and leading institutes to create a new range of surface-to-air missile systems—the first generation of Ground Troops' Air Defense systems, systems such as the ("Krug"), ("Kub"), "Osa", the renowned "Shilka", and the mobile surface-to-air missile system "Strela-2".

[Correspondent] I have to add that the aforementioned systems became part of the arsenal not just of the Soviet Army, but also of the armed forces of the socialist commonwealth countries and many African and Near East states. For many years they served faithfully, gaining an excellent reputation in a whole series of local wars, of which there were so many in the sixties and seventies—Egypt, Syria, the Arab-Israeli war.... More than half of these series-produced models of surface-to-air missile systems are still in the arsenal of a number of states of those regions.

Now to a small detail. Everyone knows that our counterpart of the renowned U.S. Patriot missile is the S-300 surface-to-air missile system. This is true. But only in part. Because in actual fact there is not just one S-300 system but three. And they are quite different. Only the

system used by the Air Defense Forces proper, so to speak, resembles the Patriot. The system used by Ground Troops' Air Defense is five to eight years ahead of the much vaunted Patriot as to its specifications, performance characteristics, and capability. The [Ground] Troops' modification of the S-300 was developed at the Emba test range, which, unlike other ranges, was opened up only during the nineties. Who knows? Perhaps this is why the Patriot is seven to eight years behind.

All these years the Emba test range was not just serving the cutting edge of modern scientific thought, it also helped to resolve the troops' vital problems. Up to 100 combined units and units annually hold tactical exercises here which invariably include firing practice. For this purpose a training center was set up alongside the research unit when the test range was built. There were many problems at the time. Sometimes they arose out of an elementary lack of knowledge about living and working conditions at the test range.

[Passage omitted: 50-second reminiscences of a retired Major-General on efforts to draw attention and raise money for the test range]

[Correspondent] Much water has flowed down the Emba river since then. Different missiles are rumbling at the test range today, different problems are worrying the missilemen. For the third year running this unique facility finds itself in a situation of legal absurdity. Essentially, its status has not been defined in any way. The stumbling block is the size of the rent which Russia is to pay to Kazakhstan to ensure that the test range remains in joint use. According to a spokesman of the Russian Ministry of Defense, as far as our side is concerned, all the necessary documentation has been ready for a long time. What is more, the Ministry of Finance is ready to start paying immediately. But the Kazakh side wants more money. Alas, there is a ceiling beyond which it is impossible to go, no matter how much the military would like to retain this unique facility. And while the tug-of-war between the two sides' diplomats and military is continuing, officers, NCO's, and servicemen and their families continue to live and serve on this piece of land scorched by the sun and gunfire.

[Unidentified young servicemen] The explanation for the success of the current firing practice is the great coordination between commanders from division to battery and detail level. But for this harmony and coordination there would be no firing practice.

[Second young servicemen] Not forgetting the servicemen, of course.

[Correspondent] But the servicemen are few and far between at the test range nowadays. There is a 60 percent shortfall in compulsory military service personnel. For this reason the firing practices are carried out and the equipment is serviced mainly by officers. If you add to this the fact that the test range has only 80 percent of the

required number of officers, you begin to understand that it is not just because of the burning sun that people get hot during firing practices sometimes. The usual difficulties of service here have been compounded in recent years by purely local, specific difficulties. Customs barriers are making delivery of supplies to the test range difficult. Prices of essential goods and foodstuffs are marked up. If somebody needs to make an urgent trip to Russia, the family budget is crippled almost beyond repair. But there is one advantage to service at the test range. Just imagine, there is no housing problem at Emba. None at all. What is more, there is so much housing that officer families are able to choose apartments. Alas, the explanation is simple. The drastic cuts in appropriations for the development of new types of weapons at the Emba test range have produced a resounding echo in the corridors of deserted hotels, laboratories, and housing. Many specialists have left. The test range's staffing has also been substantially reduced.

The advent of Kazakhstan's sovereignty resulted in a focus on environmental concerns. All matter of commissions, including international commissions, have visited the test range over the past three years. But quite unexpectedly for all of them, the test range proved to be the cleanest of the test ranges located outside Russia. The local population in the city of Emba is closely following the talks on the fate of the test range. This is understandable. If the test range goes, a substantial section of the population will lose jobs which are paid in Russian rubles.

Recently, for the first time in the history of the test range, specialists from countries which might prove potential buyers of arms were invited to Emba. Speaking quite plainly, the envoys of rich but dependent states complained of strong pressure from the United States dissuading them from buying Russian weapons. So now you know.

The Americans themselves no longer make a secret of their attitude to Russian weapons. The effectiveness of a number of the latest air defense systems is 30 to 40 percent higher than that of similar U.S. equipment, according to a Pentagon experts' report. So we have something to be proud of.

It is difficult to say what the future holds for the Emba test range. The development work carried out at the end of the eighties makes it possible to hope that, provided Russia reaches agreement with Kazakhstan, third-generation surface-to-air missile systems will, despite everything, appear at the famous test range.

But there is one more serious problem. Research in the sphere of the development of new types of weapons continues to be curtailed. Let's hope that, having managed to preserve this test range, our only consolation will not be a loss of interest in it on the part of foreign special services because there is nothing more to test here.

NAVAL FORCES

Joint Basing of Russian, Ukrainian Fleets Causes Conflict

944F1451B Moscow: *SEGODNYA in Russian*
2 Sep 94 p 4

[Article by Viktor Yabukha, reporting from Stavropol: "Two Bears in One Den: Joint Basing of the Russian and Ukrainian Fleets Provokes Constant Clashes"]

[Text] The Sevastopol Internal Affairs Administration continues to investigate cases of outrages committed by members of the local militia and the Ukrainian national guard against Black Sea Fleet sailors. The city is currently conducting joint militia and national guard patrols, and there are also patrols by the Black Sea Fleet's Sevastopol Garrison and the Ukrainian Navy. Incidents between military personnel under allegiance to different states have occurred here before, and this has repeatedly prompted Viktor Semenov, chairman of the Sevastopol City Soviet, and Russian experts at the Black Sea Fleet negotiations to question the wisdom of basing two fleets in one city. This summer, following Leonid Kuchma's election, the political furor over Sevastopol died down. But the potential for conflict between fleet-related and Ukrainian structures seems to have been sublimated into crude assault and battery.

As our *SEGODNYA* correspondent was able to learn by talking with Black Sea Fleet officers and warrant officers, on the evening of 3 June a Black Sea Fleet warrant officer named Butmerchuk was savagely beaten on a city square by a joint militia and national guard detachment. At a military hospital, to which he was taken suffering from a concussion and multiple contusions to the body, the warrant officer underwent trephination of his skull. Soon afterward he filed a complaint with the prosecutor of Sevastopol's Leninskiy Rayon. On 10 July, after leaving the hospital, Butmerchuk was once again brutally beaten, but this time by unidentified assailants. This time militia officers took him, suffering from a fractured skull, not to a military hospital, but instead to the nearest city hospital, where he died a week later.

Twenty-five sailors from one fleet unit were assigned to pick vegetables in the village of Krasnyy Mak, a part of Ukraine Kolkhoz near Bakhchisarai. On the evening of 17 August several muscular young men wearing the uniform of the Ukrainian National Guard and carrying rubber clubs burst into the barracks where they were staying. In response to the men's question of "Who are you?" senior warrant officer Klimtsov answered: "Black Sea Fleet sailors, here to harvest vegetables." Thereupon the intruders, shouting, "oh, so you're with the Black Sea Fleet," began beating everyone in the barracks with their clubs. After the beating the sailors' belts were taken (a common sign of *dedovshchina* [military hazing] and a symbol of humiliation), and the warrant officer's uniform and striped shirt were taken as well. Kondratyuk, a petty officer first class, was taken to Bakhchisarai City Hospital suffering from a concussion.

Literally the next day unidentified individuals wearing camouflage clothing attacked seamen Gumenny and Umrikhin, who were standing at a checkpoint of one of the fleet's units in Sevastopol. Both were hospitalized with the same diagnosis: concussion of the brain...

A few days previously warrant officer Pasych, a technician with a missile artillery unit of the Black Sea Fleet's patrol vessel "Sderzhanny," was detained at a streetcar stop by a unit of the Ukrainian National Guard and escorted to Sevastopol's Leninskiy Rayon Internal Affairs Department, where he was brutally beaten. He was taken to the hospital with a diagnosis of "cerebral concussion."

The first small units of the Ukrainian National Guard were deployed to Sevastopol by air over two nights during the early summer of this year and stationed at central locations at the site of the former Nakhimov School and a former air defense unit base. The battalion's size soon reached 350 men. The official purpose of its arrival was to step up the fight against crime and all types of disorder. The guard members have several pieces of armored equipment in addition to their firearms.

It cannot be said that by doing this ex-President Kravchuk, to whom the National Guard is officially directly subordinate, was in any way singling out Sevastopol. The full-time Ukrainian National Guard, created by his edict of 26 April 1994, has 40,000 men, and according to the aforementioned edict the five guard divisions are supposed to patrol 14 of the republic's industrial and cultural centers. The Sevastopol battalion of the Ukrainian National Guard is part of the staff structure of a separate Crimean brigade, a portion of which is stationed in Simferopol. In addition, the National Guard structure includes a separate helicopter brigade and a rapid deployment division with bases in central and eastern Ukraine.

However, the people of the Crimea, a large portion of whom are oriented toward political self-determination and restoration of ties with Russia, regard the National Guard units as "punitive forces" brought in to maintain authority and suppress active dissent. Local politicians claim that they do not possess precise mobilization information on the National Guard, but a majority of deputies in the Crimean parliament are convinced that it is comprised of Western Ukrainian natives. "Yeltsin can rely on the Army to resolve internal conflicts, but Kravchuk cannot," they shouted at demonstrations two months ago, "and that is why he created the National Guard."

It is up to Ukraine's new president to decide how to resolve the current standoff in Sevastopol, and perhaps up to the delegations presently negotiating over the Black Sea Fleet as well. For now there remains in effect an official promise by fleet commander Eduard Baltin to issue sailors weapons with which to defend themselves, should the attacks on them continue. Gen.

Vivat Beloborodov, who as head of the city internal affairs department coordinates interaction between the militia and national guardsmen in Sevastopol, told a SEGODNYA correspondent that he cannot comment on Baltin's statement until the official investigation into these incidents is complete.

REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES

Rate of Inflation Alters Budget Expectations

94UM0596B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 22 Sep 94 p 2

[Article by Vladimir Yermolin: "What the Coming Month Has in Store for Us: Army's Budget Funding in Doubt, and Off-Budget Funding Is Out of the Question"]

[Text] A press release issued by the Russian Federation Ministry of Finance before a press conference devoted to the subject, "The Current Economic Situation and Funding of Budget Expenditures," says, among other things: "The government has yet to announce that the figures for expenditures cited in the budget are based on overstated inflationary expectations. If one is to adjust defense spending only for the difference in inflation rates, it comes to not 40.6 trillion rubles for the year, but about 32 trillion rubles."

To this one must add that Article 32 of the Russian Federation law on the 1994 federal budget, which deals with the creation of a special budget fund to maintain the Armed Forces, is doomed to nonfulfillment. In response to a question from a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, Deputy Finance Minister Sergey Aleksashenko said that no such fund is being created, since it was to be raised primarily from privatization revenues. But those revenues have yet to reach the planned level (not to mention the amounts that the parliamentarians were hoping for).

How is the 1994 federal budget being implemented as a whole? According to the Finance Ministry's projections, budget revenues will total 63 trillion to 64 trillion rubles, while expenditures will amount to 125 trillion to 128 trillion rubles. This means that the amounts of expenditures approved in the budget law will be implemented at an average level of 64 to 66 percent. Taxes will be collected somewhere in the area of 51 to 52 percent. In the Finance Ministry's opinion, this situation is attributable to an inflation rate that is lower than the Ministry of Economics had predicted, to a more significant drop in total production (the figure for the year as a whole will be 20 percent, as against eight percent in the March projection), and, finally, to the tax agencies' inability to collect the planned taxes.

Functions of Statistical Mapping Unit

94UM0596.1 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 22 Sep 94 p 2

[Article by Nikolay Poroskov: "Urgent Topic: Battle Outcome Plotted on Map. An Electronic One."]

[Text] An old army joke. The crew commander asks his navigation officer: "Did you bring the map?"

"I forgot it," he answered, embarrassed.

"Hell, we'll have to navigate by a Belomor cigarette pack."

In place of the pilot, that joke could be told with equal success about a sailor or infantryman. A soldier, whether in an exercise or in real combat, can in no way do his job without a map. Recall, in films, the nighttime vigils at the High Command and at the front staffs: the papirosa smoke, the teacups on the edge of an enormous table covered with variously colored maps marked with red and blue arrows. Without exaggeration, those maps were used to decide the outcome of the war; for it is impossible for any person, even a Solomon, to comprehend the enormous spaces filled with military forces that are, moreover, in motion.

And how have the cosmonauts traveled so far? For them too, maps are indispensable. On the first missions, maps were wound up on spools which the crew rotated to find the place on the globe over which it had just flown. A certain dissonance was to be observed in that picture: the world's most advanced equipment, and a primitive spool, like a winch over a well. And the adhesive map sheets on the table of the commanding officer and in the field are hardly easy to use—the paper can get wet and tear, and the person changing the sheets is lucky to keep up with the unfolding operational situation.

That was the state of affairs until recently. And in the 1970s, when cruise missiles were being actively developed, the natural problem of designing their flight software arose. You can't put an ordinary paper map into the electronics of a missile. And so using mathematical conversions, they began transferring cartographic data about an area of terrain into digital form. This gave rise to a new concept—the digital terrain map. On the basis of this concept, the cruise missile computer issues commands to its guidance systems, and the missile, "reading the terrain," flies at low altitude, hugging the landscape. Indeed, this is the missile's main virtue and advantage.

For this work—producing digital terrain maps of large regions of the Earth, the topographical unit commanded today by Colonel Aleksandr Kazakevich was awarded the Order of the Red Banner of Labor in 1978; several people won the State Prize and other awards, and more than 10 received decorations and medals. Beginning in 1983, after the software was developed and the technology perfected, digital terrain maps for the Army and Navy went into mass production.

Needless to say, it was no accident that this particular team was chosen for such an important task. It had a rich history and traditions and well-organized production and research facilities.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Background Information:

The unit was formed in 1946. At first the maps were compiled on the basis of data from aerial photography and fine-tuned through trips in the field. With the development of photogrammetric equipment, the field trips became unnecessary in the production process. Beginning in 1963, photographs taken from space were used as the initial material for the maps. The Topographical Service of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, of which Kazakevich's unit is a part, has satellites outfitted with photographic equipment in orbit. Containers of film ejected from them and equipped with parachutes are retrieved at prearranged places, and then the work gets under way on Earth.

The unit's chief engineer, Colonel Nikolay Frolov, and I walked through the endless corridors of an enormous 12-story building and dropped in on the laboratories. Everywhere I saw sophisticated instruments and devices I had never seen before. The names alone tell the story: a high-precision stereocomparator, a software and computer unit for creating map altitude-plan bases, a stereophotogrammetric unit. And all of them are Russian-made, I should point out.

The unit includes mathematicians, programmers, cartographers, geodesists, even editors. Their professional qualifications are high as well: Gennadiy Shapovalov, Ivan Ladyka, Valentin Starostin, and Gennadiy Barinov are winners of the State Prize and other awards, and Vyacheslav Savochkin, Aleksandr Semenenko, Oleg Belenkov, and many others were recommended as masters of their work by their many years of service.

They also proved up to the challenge of a new stage in the development of electronic cartography. In the early 1990s, when the Armed Forces began introducing new troop command and control methods, a new concept emerged—the electronic map. It is no less than a digital terrain map projected onto a display screen, or, to use the scientific terminology, a visualized digital map.

Let us imagine, for example, a division commander who is directing a battle. There are no piles of paper maps in front of him; the division commander can enlarge any sector of the area on the screen and call up additional elements or remove secondary ones. The display enables him to see and feel the dynamics of the battle: A tank column is advancing here, and he can see how many pieces of equipment it has and its weaponry and ammunition stores. He doesn't have to use a map measurer to measure the distance from one point to another, he need only move the cursor to call up that or any other information, such as the area of a depression or the depth of a river at a crossing point. He can survey the topography of any sector of the area of interest, or call up

individual roads, bridges, and water barriers and their specifications. Without a protractor, an artillery officer can easily use the display to determine the directional angle of fire, and a radar operator can determine the area that his radar beam covers. And all this can be done quickly and without great effort. And that translates into the time factor that is so important in modern warfare.

Col Frolov's subordinates demonstrated the capabilities of the electronic map to this author without even getting up from their seats, so to speak. I had seen such screens before at central command posts of the Armed Forces and the Air Defense Forces and heard only good things about them: their ease of use, the capability to instantaneously react to changes in the operational situation, the completeness and visual nature of the information. In my opinion, the need to introduce this innovation at the lower levels of the army pyramid is clear. The Americans realized this long ago. And for this reason their missiles, during Operation Desert Storm, after being launched from a distance of hundreds of kilometers from the target, hit the bull's eye, as the specialists say. But we are being thwarted by the notorious funding problem. Col Kazakevich said the unit has only about half the funding it needs. At this rate, it is not hard to calculate that the process will taken decades.

In principle, the military topographers are already prepared to supply digital maps, including experimental models, to not only the General Staff and the main staffs of the Armed Forces branches, but also to lower levels. But the required equipment is lacking there: They have made a balalaika, but there's no score. The unit has a computerized data archive. It consists of hundreds of tapes with digital cartographic data for virtually the entire globe. The tapes are stored in temperature-controlled conditions and are protected from the effects of magnetic fields, vibration, and toxic gases. Efforts to use optical-electronic disks as data media are now under way. Even though they are significantly smaller, they can hold larger amounts of data. But again, their introduction is being held up by the lack of money.

Meanwhile, the unique production facility and technologies that were developed in conjunction with military research institutes, schools, and academies must be preserved at all costs. Even the Americans, who have progressed very far by our standards, were amazed by what they saw in the unit. After their visit, Russian and American military officials concluded an agreement "on exchanges and cooperation in the field of military topographic cartography and the development of aircraft and ship navigation maps." The unit was recently visited by specialists from China and Hungary, and the chief of the Topographical Service, Lieutenant General Vitaliy Khvostov, visited his German colleagues; in exchange for aerial photography data from earlier years that were of interest to the Germans, he brought back computers that the service badly needs. Contracts for compiling maps have been

concluded with several countries. And the work is already under way. In short, the unit also earns money.

But cutbacks have affected this team as well. Moreover, the unique unit will no doubt experience a shortage of specialists in the near future, for plans call for merging the only topographic school in St. Petersburg with the Military Space Institute. Why, the perplexed topographers ask, couldn't it merge with a rear-services school? Rear services provide equipment, and we provide maps. Here, in my opinion, a brief excursion into history is appropriate.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Background Information:

The geodesy department of the General Staff's Nikolayev Academy usually had two or three students at any given time, and future general Vitkovskiy was its only student. Aware of the value of military topographers, however, the "staff" was never cut. A curious argument against cuts was cited by Colonel Vladimir Starodubtsev of the Topographical Service: Yes, the number of regiments and divisions is getting smaller, but the territory remains the same. And you have to know where to place even a single gun.

The personnel agencies have something to think about here. Especially considering that the service as a whole and the unit have no fewer missions. Take, for example, the job of demarcating borders that is actively under way today. And let's not forget the dual-use aspect of the maps being prepared here—military and civilian. According to Major General Anatoliy Kunchenko, the military can produce one map sheet at approximately one-fifth the cost of the Russian Cartographic Service.

Col Kazakevich's unit is one link in the chain of the geodesic information system. Not very many years ago, the minute a disturbance occurred in some region of the world or an earthquake or natural disaster struck somewhere, the unit received an order to supply the needed maps. Can we be insured against this in the future? Hardly, and this is confirmed by the numerous "trouble spots" on the territory of the former Soviet Union. And this too is an argument in favor of reinforcing the unit and solving the urgent problems that currently confront it: It needs new electronic equipment, and film and disks are sometimes in short supply.

The difficult process of saturating the forces with electronic maps and the equipment used to reproduce them is now under way. The Topographical Service is swamped with orders—the advantages of the innovation are self-evident. Moreover, far smaller quantities of the usual paper maps for military training are now being issued—the printing plants' equipment has become obsolete. On the other hand, any delays in introducing electronic maps run the risk of preventing the Army and Navy from taking a qualitatively new step forward in troop command and control. And if that happens, won't we have to take our bearings from a Belomor cigarette pack again?

INTERREGIONAL MILITARY ISSUES**Peacekeeping Elements in Georgian-Ossetia**

94UM0589A Unknown PRIKAZ OBYEDINENNOGO VOYENNOGO KO'IAKOVANIYA SSMP in Russian
16 Jun 94 pp 1-7

[Order of Joint Military Command of Composite Peace and Law and Order Forces dated 16 June 1993, city of Tskhinvali]

[Text]

ORDER**OF SSMP JOINT MILITARY COMMAND**

16 June 1993

City of Tskhinvali

#7

[One word illegible]: "On organization of service-combat activities of the Joint Forces in Ossetian-Georgian conflict zone."

In the ten months of their presence, the peacemaking forces have stabilized the situation in the conflict zone and security corridor to a considerable extent. Armed opposition has been stopped and the opposing sides have been separated.

But the situation still remains difficult and strained.

The nature of the crimes committed (premeditated murders, robberies, robberies with violence, and armed attacks on citizens, outposts and so on indicate that organized, well-armed bandit forces still are operating in the conflict zone and security corridor; by their pronounced nationalistic direction, they are terrorizing the populace and filling them with fear, panic and uncertainty about tomorrow.

The activity of these armed groups does not relieve tension, but creates constant preconditions for a renewal of the conflict.

Measures planned by the Joint Command for confiscating weapons from the population are not being fulfilled due to the inability of law-protection agencies (Georgian and Ossetian) to handle this matter. And the population will not surrender weapons voluntarily for fear of the appearance of a new armed conflict and for protection against criminal groups.

Exhaustive steps have not been taken up to now to restore local law-protection agencies, jointly fight criminals and violators of public order and establish the proper regime in the conflict zone.

The activeness of peacemaking measures also has declined.

During the time peacemaking forces were present in the conflict zone, 87 persons, 22 of whom were personnel of peacemaking forces, have perished at the hands of bandit elements; 69 have been wounded; and 65 persons, among them 29 peacemakers, have been held hostage.

There have been instances of motor transport and other equipment blowing up on objects that had not been neutralized.

The primary mission of peacemaking forces in this stage is to stop criminal activity of destructive forces striving to exacerbate the situation and striving to renew armed clashes, and in coordination with law-protection agencies to fight criminal elements and on this basis establish guaranteed conditions for the return of refugees to places where they previously lived.

To normalize the situation and keep peace and law and order in the conflict zone, WE ORDER:

DEPLOY SUBUNITS OF COMPOSITE PEACE AND LAW AND ORDER FORCES AS FOLLOWS:

1. Headquarters, SSMP [Joint Peace and Law and Order Forces], Ossetian battalion headquarters, service and support subunits of peacemaking forces (reconnaissance platoon, headquarters security platoon, signal platoon, mortar battery, antitank platoon, logistic support platoon, combat engineer platoon) in city of Tskhinvali—the SSMP post.

2. FOR RUSSIAN BATTALION

Helicopter regiment	Battalion headquarters, 6th Motorized Rifle Company (MRC), grenade launcher platoon, antitank platoon, logistic support platoon, signal platoon
Airfield	3rd Platoon, 5th MRC with mission of providing security for helicopters and the airfield
City of Tskhinvali (SSMP post)	Mortar battery, reconnaissance platoon, signal platoon and battalion aid station—reserve of commander, 2nd Motorized Rifle Battalion and of Headquarters, SSMP
Eredvi village	4th MRC (less 3rd Motorized Rifle Platoon (MRP)), stationing location—MTS [machine-tractor station] with zone of responsibility: Argvitsi (2678), Berula (2079), Dmenisi (2382), Charebi (2781), Sarikari (2480). Have following troop details: checkpoint south edge of Tamarasheni, north edge of Kekhvi, patrol in Eredvi
Prisi village	3rd Platoon, 4th MRC, stationing location—residence by GAI [State Motor Vehicle Inspectorate] post with zone of responsibility: Sabatsminda (1680), Prisi (1877), TEK [fuel and energy complex] (1676). Have following troop details: checkpoint—TEK; patrol in Prisi
Gudzhabauri village	1st Platoon, 5th MRC—stationing location—private home on southeast edge of village with zone of responsibility: bridge (1577), (excluded) Ergneti (1674), (excluded) Kvemo-Nikozi (1677). Have following troop details: patrol in Gudzhabauri
Artsevi village	2nd Platoon, 5th MRC—stationing location—s/s [possibly village council] building with zone of responsibility: (B)eridzhvari ¹ (2876), Adzvisitavi (3268), Kvemo-orkula (2674), Zemo-Kere (2676). Have following troop details: patrol (Russian-Ossetian) in Artsevi

3. FOR GEORGIAN BATTALION:

Zemo-Nikozi village	Two-story building on airfield grounds—battalion headquarters, reserve company, support and service subunits with zone of responsibility: Kvemo-Nikozi (**73), Variani (**6*), *akasheti ((1)462), Kalktseuli ((1)67), Kvemo-Khvisi (**71), Zemo-Nikozi ((1)474)
Sakorintlo village	Stationing location—secondary school building with zone of responsibility: Khviti (5654), Samtavisi (5*53), Kvemo-Rene (4652), Nafireti (3853), (K)itelubani (3856), Didi Khurvaleti (425(8)), (Z)alantkari (455(0)). Have following troop details: patrol in village of Sakorintlo
Akhalubani village	Stationing location—village club with zone of responsibility: *arara Medzhvriskevi (3(6)67), Bershuyeti (3963), Kvemo Shavshvebi (3754), Karaleti (2556), Kitsnisi (2566), Klavi (2671), Kveshi (2866). Have following troop details: patrol in Akhalubani
Disevi village	Stationing location—secondary school with zone of responsibility: (K)ere (2572), Dzevera (2264), *rotsleti (**7*), Kordi (2176), Ksuisi (2475). Have following troop details: patrol in Disevi
Vanati village	Stationing location—secondary school building with zone of responsibility: Dzordzhiani (2284), Satskheneti (24(8)5), (excluded) Dmenisi (2382). Have following troop details: checkpoint northeast edge of Vanati, patrol in Vanati
Ergneti village	Stationing location—kindergarten building with zone of responsibility: Ditsi (2675), Megvrekisi ((1)672), Ergneti (1674). Have following troop details: checkpoint Kuravodstroy [Kura Aquicultural Construction] building, patrol in village of Ergneti
Kurta village	Stationing location—kolkhoz board building with zone of responsibility: Kemerta (1387), (D)zartsemi (1585), Kheiti (1580), Tamarasheni (1480), Kekhvi (1285). Have following troop details: checkpoint north edge of Kekhvi, south edge of Tamarasheni, patrol in village of Kurta
Nuli village	Stationing location—kindergarten building with zone of responsibility: (excluded) (Ch)imasi ((0)575), (excluded) (G)vertevi (0676), (excluded) ST(F) ((0)674). Have following troop details: patrol in Nuli
Avnevi village	Stationing location—kolkhoz board with zone of responsibility: ST(F) (0674), (excluded) Didmukha (077*), bend in road ((0)673). Have following troop details: patrol in Avnevi
Takhtisdziri village	Stationing location—farm building with zone of responsibility: Dvani (077*), Breti (0*6*), Sagolasheni (0859), Kvenatkotsa (0257), Gogeti (0364), Dirbi (0665). Have following troop details: checkpoint south edge of Muguti, patrol in Takhtisdziri
Knolevi village	Stationing location—[one word illegible, possibly "Finnish"] hut with zone of responsibility: Tamarasheni (**65), Mokhisi (*858), Atotsi (**6*), Bredza (*666), Knolevi (***)9. Have following troop details: checkpoint south edge of Kvemo Okona, patrol in Knolevi
Koda village	Stationing location—village club with zone of responsibility: (Ch)arinsisi ((9)56(9)), Abisistavi (9*6*), (K)odavartsisubani (9559), Mekhtisdzhvari (**63), Koda (9468). Have following troop details: east edge of village of Tselisi, patrol in Koda
Beloti village	Stationing location—tourist center building with zone of responsibility: (excluded) Satskheneti (**85), (E)igu(p)a (*787), Zemo-Zonkari ((3)*84), Zemo-Snek(n)i (2683). Have following troop details: patrol in Beloti

4. FOR OSSETIAN BATTALION:

Enauri village	1st MRC (less 3rd MRP), support platoon, stationing location—two residences on south edge of village with zone of responsibility: Kornisi (0382), Arkneti (0577), Chimasi (0479), *rinevi (0473), Kvemo-Okona (9870), (M)etekhi (9(0)*4), Nagutni (9479), Zemo Tsorbisi ((0)*3). Have following troop details: checkpoint south edge of Okona, patrol in Enauri
Tselisi village	3rd Platoon, 1st MRC, stationing location—residence on northeast edge of village with zone of responsibility: G(v)irgvina (**7*), Kaleti (947*), Tselisi (936(8)). Have following troop details: checkpoint east edge of Tselisi, patrol in village of Kaleti
Ortevi village	1st Platoon, 2nd MRC, stationing location—residence on south edge of village with zone of responsibility: Otatikau (2692), Klars (2296), *armazeti (2488), (excluded) Dzhordzhiani (2284), Kokhati (2182), Zemo-Sarabuki (1982), Tliakani (1885). Have following troop details: checkpoint south edge of Ortevi, patrol: Sarabuk-Kokhat, Khelchua
Didi Gromi village	2nd Platoon, 2nd MRC, stationing location—kindergarten building with zone of responsibility: Benderi (3681), Kvemo Vilda (4280), Zemo Bikari (4174), Kitriuli (4066), Didi Gromi (3469), Zemo Goreti (3374). Have following troop details: checkpoint south edge of Didi Gromi, patrol in village of Benderi
Tsinagari village	3rd Platoon, 2nd MRC, stationing location—sovkhoz board building with zone of responsibility: Kvemo Tsolda (4371), Zemo Tsubeni (4667), Monasteri (4958), Orchoshani (4457), Tsinagari (416(0)), Kigriuli (4*66). Have following troop details: checkpoint west edge of Monasteri, patrol in villages of Dzukata, Abrevi, Tskhiloni
Artsevi village	Motorized rifle squad, stationing location—two-story house in center of village with zone of responsibility: (B)eri-Dzhvari (2876), Ardzhvistavi [sic] (326*), Kvemo-*orkula (2674), Zemo-Kere (2676). Have following troop details: patrol—villages of Artsevi (Russian-Ossetian), Ortevi
City of Tskhinvali, SSMP post	1st Platoon, 3rd MRC, with mission: escort motor transport columns along approved routes; [one word illegible] of 4th MRC—checkpoint—filling station southeast of Tskhinvali
Dzivleti village	2nd Platoon, 3rd MRC, stationing location—secondary school building with zone of responsibility: (excluded) (P)rinevi ((0)473), Zemo-Dvani (0571), G(v)irgvina (0667), Lashe ((0)365), Ioncha ((0)(0)67), Khadelani ((0)(0)68), (B)adani (027*). Have following troop details: patrol in villages of Belebi, Dzivleti, Lashe-Ioncha
Muguti village	3rd Platoon, 3rd MRC, stationing location—sovkhoz board building with zone of responsibility: Didmukha (0772), Muguti (087(0)), Chorbauli (077(1)). Have following troop details: checkpoint south edge of Muguti
(I)grapisi village	2nd Platoon, 3rd MRC: stationing location—store building with zone of responsibility: Muguti (**(0)*), Kvemo-Khvtse (*497), (S)veri (*2**), Zemo-Korseni (0697). Have following troop details: checkpoints [figure illegible] km south of (I)grapisi, north edge of village of Kekhvi
Ruk village	3rd Platoon, 4th MRC, stationing location—south portal of Rok Tunnel with mission: provide reliable security of south portal. Have following troop details: checkpoint south portal

Air group commander is to have helicopters in 30-minute readiness. Use helicopters by decision of Joint Military Command for moving troop details, hunting and destroying bandit elements, conducting reconnaissance and performing other missions that arise.

Tskhinvali military commandant's office is to supervise compliance with curfew and behavior of servicemen of peacemaking forces, provide escort for columns over established routes, and maintain public order and fight criminal elements in coordination with law-protection agencies.

To carry out the missions enumerated above, place personnel at the military commandant's disposal according to the schedule. To organize an escort for motor transport columns, set up an escort team from each party consisting of two squads with two vehicles (BTR's).

To perform missions that arise suddenly, have a reserve made up of the following:

- reconnaissance platoon from Russian battalion
- motorized rifle platoon from Georgian battalion
- reconnaissance platoon from Ossetian battalion

Use the reserve by decision of Joint Military Command of Composite Forces.

The composite observer team works under the direction of the Joint Military Command. Have mobile teams and three fixed observation posts for most effective use of observers. Place fixed posts at Tamarasheni, Kekhvi and the filling station.

The secretary of the SKK [Mixed Oversight Commission] is to plan the activity of observer teams daily, generalize collected information, and submit a memorandum to the Joint Military Command about work done and the operational situation in the conflict zone weekly by Wednesday.

At the request of the SKK secretary, each party is to assign a BTR (BRDM) and one motor vehicle to support the activity of composite observer teams.

Subunit commanders are to give assistance in performance of assigned missions by composite observer teams and ensure their safety at stationing points and in zones of responsibility.

Troop details (sentries at traffic control barriers for escort of transport) are posted in the area of operations

and sent out only as composite details. Use of BMP's and BTR's as part of troop details is only by decision of the Joint Military Command.

Each incident concerning a question of relations among the parties and also problems of observance of order and legality by peacemaking forces are investigated and steps taken by decision of the Joint Military Command.

Personnel shall be released from deployment locations only for family circumstances. Presence at, departure from, and entry into the area of operations of peacemaking forces shall be certified by an appropriate document—travel orders or leave pass. Release from the subunit deployment area with weapon as well as being off duty with weapon is not allowed.

Subunits and troop details of the Composite Forces shall be guided in their activity by the "Statute on Composite Forces for Establishing Peace and Maintaining Law and Order in the Conflict Zone" (see articles 1-4).

The chief signal officer is to calculate and organize communications at the troop detail/subunit/SSMP Headquarters echelon.

Battalion commanders and the city commandant are to report the state of affairs to SSMP Headquarters at 0700 and 1800, or immediately when there are incidents.

5. Communicate to subunit commanders the part of the order that concerns them.

SSMP JOINT MILITARY COMMAND

from Russia	from Ossetia	from Georgia
Major General	Colonel	Colonel
A. SARDUSHKIN	K. FRIYEV	N. TATARASHVILI

CHIEF OF SSMP JOINT STAFF

Colonel A. USHAKOV

Footnotes

[1. Translator's note: Single letters and numbers that are missing or illegible are represented by an asterisk; single letters and digits that are partially legible but still questionable are enclosed in parentheses. Parentheses around four-digit grid references are as shown in original text.]

UKRAINE

Minister on Machinebuilding, Conversion Issues

94UM0563A Kiev URYADOVYY KURYER
in Ukrainian 9 Aug 94 p 5

[Interview with Minister of Machine Building, the Military-Industrial Complex and Conversion Viktor Petrov by Yuliya Belova: "Machine Building: Under the Weight of Problems"]

[Text] Machine building is a sector whose products signify a great deal to the Ukrainian economy. It is a two-million-strong army of production workers at 1,636 enterprises and scientific institutes today. The problems of the sector are not of a narrow, specialized nature, but rather are typical of the state of the entire national economy of Ukraine today. That was indeed the topic of discussion between our correspondent and Viktor Petrov, minister of machine building, the military-industrial complex (VPK) and conversion.

[Belova] The main causes of the crisis situation today include the sharp reduction in effective demand for products, which has become especially noticeable after the December total rise in prices for power carriers. Whereas in 1992-93 the sector was effectively maintaining production at the same level and, despite the uncontrolled rush to conversion, was replacing production volumes of military products with consumer goods nonetheless, we have had a 50-percent drop in production over the first half of this year.

[Petrov] We have several trillion worth of agricultural equipment sitting in our warehouses because the enterprises of other sectors, lacking sufficient working capital, and consumers cannot buy our products. One cannot assert that they do not need all of this. Demand has dropped for complex domestic appliances, microelectronics, automobiles, televisions and tape recorders, because at today's wage levels people are not able to buy those products.

The first thing that requires review is tax policy. We often talk about the tax squeeze today. But simply asking for a reduction in taxes... We should produce some concrete plan, and show that overall turnover could be raised by reducing certain factors. We already have some experience of this sort. One example is the Zaporizhzhya Motor Works, where the sale of automobiles had virtually halted owing to the excessively high excise taxes. A reduction in taxes, and also the fact that the association itself found opportunities to reduce costs, effected a reduction in the prices of automobiles; as a result, their sales increased, and thus so did payments to the budget.

Second is currency regulation. We are rejecting the coarse, simplistic approach to the problem, where they say that the exchange rate of the karbovanets to the dollar must be at the level of 45,000 karbovantsi. That is not, in any case, the rate at which genuine interaction takes place, but rather a purely speculative rate that is formulated for a very narrow list of goods. I often use the phrase of an American businessman, who said that the currency exchange rate of a nation such as Ukraine should not be based on chewing gum. We should not, however, permit some other extreme therein—such as when the rate was 12,610 karbovantsi to the U.S. dollar for several months. The maintenance of that rate led to considerable losses. Exports became unprofitable. The populist law with the deadline for the return of currency receipts within 30 days, and the powerful economic

sanctions that were imposed after that, eliminated from enterprises the desire to engage in exports. This policy is exceptionally flexible around the world (monitoring of the return of currency receipts doubtless exists). It is a serious issue, since if it is simply not profitable for Ukrainian enterprises to engage in exports and markets, then the threat exists of the loss of foreign markets. Once having lost a market, it is very difficult to win it back later.

Third, the maintenance of an enormous social sphere. We have enterprises in small cities that fuel, treat and educate virtually the entire city or a considerable portion of it. That is an unbearable burden today. A corresponding edict of the president exists that pertains to transferring a portion of all this to the local authorities. The edict is not being fulfilled, however, since there is no mechanism with which to do it. The social sphere could be placed under the jurisdiction of the local authorities, slightly altering tax policy. This burden must be fairly shared, however.

A fee for gas in hard currency has been imposed on the enterprises in our ministry and Minprom [Ministry of Industry]. It is not enough that we are to pay a price for gas that crosses the border, we are charged almost another 15 dollars as payment for transit, some mythical difference that should go to the budget. This is just the sort of case where a kopeck comes in and then ten go out, because this artificially raises the price for all of our products. Currency could be in short supply, and we are forced to purchase it at auctions, but we have the right to include it in our cost only at the National Bank exchange rate.

There was a time when the profits of enterprises went for the maintenance of the social sphere, for technical development, and not to cover taxes. Today the enterprises are forced to spend furious amounts of money for the upkeep of the social sphere, and then pay a tax of 22 percent.

We realize that we do not have the right to speak, since all of the causes of this situation lie outside our sector. We need to perform a clear-cut analysis of what could be done, and what not.

Objective reasons exist for the fact that overhead expenditures have gone up sharply, but there are enterprises that are holding them at the level of several hundred percent, and others that have crossed the 2,000—3,000 line. Not everything has yet been done for the economical utilization of power resources. The maintenance of an excessive quantity of workers continues, and this is reflected in the price of the products. And it is true when we say that effective demand had dropped, but there exists the opportunity to cut prices as well by reducing expenditures and increasing efficiency.

The regional utilization of the state capital investments that are allocated to the sector—rather than “scattering” them among hundreds of enterprises—is important, as is

the determination of priority areas. Increasing exports has to be a priority, since Ukraine can exist normally as a nation only when it has large export income.

We should also talk about the necessity of putting an end to the mindset of social dependence. Some collectives are working in more or less stable fashion, while others confine themselves to complaints against the state.

There was a very serious discussion at the congress about the radical structural restructuring of the sector. The leaders among our markets have traditionally been, and will remain, Russia and the other CIS countries. Those countries, however, are today actively pursuing a policy of assimilating those products that we have been supplying to them. How will we be able to compete in those markets today, the more so as our power carriers are being sold at prices that are significantly higher than the prices within Russia? Only by increasing the efficiency of our production.

I am convinced (as are many specialists at the ministry), in the same way, that we will achieve nothing if we do not put an end to the self-contained production cycle. This leads to a substantial increase in product cost. We thus intend to reorganize it in serious fashion. I have in mind the creation of holding companies and financial-industrial groups, the greater specialization of enterprises and, on that basis, an increase in cooperative supply among enterprises.

[Belova] Is a reorganization of the enterprises in the sector taking place?

[Petrov] There is virtually no reorganization occurring, although that is a very important issue. We have, after all, a large quantity of unique enterprises. The economic difficulties in Ukraine and in Russia have reduced the number of orders sharply. But we do not have the right to squander accumulated potential, since it is not known how we will restore it later; the process, that is, is forced. The situation is hampered by the lack of funds. But I think that if the available funds are distributed correctly and a strict regimen of economy is imposed, and the funds are directed only toward solving the necessary problems, then they can be found.

[Belova] We were saying that there is a rush to conversion, which has caused more harm than good. What lessons have we drawn from that?

[Petrov] Any unsupervised process—and the rush to conversion is one such process—cannot have any positive consequences. There exists a threat of the loss of what we have, and I do not know when we will be able to restore it, but the Supreme Soviet has adopted the military doctrine of Ukraine. We need to specify and define today how many products, and of what type, we should be putting out.

[Belova] Sector science is in a grave state today. How do you plan to support it?

[Petrov] We will certainly be unable to get by without the development of sector science (40 percent of the scientific potential of all of Ukraine is concentrated in the sector). The ministry has devised a clear-cut stance—we cannot permit the elimination of the base of the scientific organizations. How did it used to be? A plant, and a design bureau or institute with it; today many plants are planning to “evict” science, and leave themselves with the facilities in which the scientific institutions were accommodated.

[Belova] I think the problem of cadre personnel requires immediate resolution today, since a considerable number of highly skilled specialists are working in the sector who are receiving wages that do not correspond either to their qualifications or to their experience.

[Petrov] I can illustrate this with numbers. Machine building was in eighth place among the sectors of the national economy of Ukraine in average wages in 1991, and today it is 25th. Our misfortune is that we are at the end of a technological chain, and the monopoly enterprises that stand at the beginning of it—the extraction sector, power engineering—are unfortunately dictating their own terms. We cannot do that. A clear-cut state policy is required in this regard.

The problem of regulatory mechanism and the problem of paying the general professions arise here. The high wages in some sectors testify not to the efficiency of their operations, but rather to their monopoly positions. That is even though we are in no way saying that we must demand that wages be lowered in those sectors; I do not think they are very high.

[Belova] The discussion during the meeting of representatives of the sector with government officials concerned the reorientation of state orders for the sector...

[Petrov] The state order is pretty much a fiction using the technique that was drawn up in 1993. We are convinced that we must move away from this double accounting in 1995. The size of the state order should correspond to the financial capabilities of the state, as well as be a full guarantee of its timely payment.

Navy's Cooperation With Germany, Military School Reforms

944F1451A Moscow *SEGODNYA* in Russian
31 Aug 94 p 6

[Article by Viktor Yabukha, reporting from Sevastopol: “Ukrainian Navy Seeks Cooperation With Germany—Meanwhile Endless Reform of the Country's Military Institutions Weakens Republic's Defensive Capability”]

[Text] On 29 August a delegation of military nuclear experts specializing in nuclear energy arrived in Sevastopol from Germany. The purpose of their visit, according to official reports, was “to deepen cooperation between the Department of Nuclear Energy Installation Operations at Sevastopol Naval Institute (under the

Ukrainian Ministry of Defense) and corresponding structures in Germany.” The delegation of nuclear specialists was headed by Germany's military attache in Ukraine.

According to Vice-Admiral Vladimir Beskorovaynyy, who commands the Ukrainian Navy, this visit is only the beginning of cooperation between Germany and Ukraine in the field of establishing scientific units related to the nuclear industry and in the field of operating nuclear installations and exchanging experience with actions to be taken in the event of emergencies at nuclear facilities. Moreover, the experience gained will also be used by Germany's nuclear submarine fleet. In addition, during the course of meetings between the Ukrainian Navy leadership and German officers certain aspects of fleet basing which are of timely interest to Ukraine will also be considered. “If we find points of commonality in the area of military technology, then we will definitely continue to develop those points,” stated Vice-Admiral Vladimir Beskorovaynyy, Ukrainian Navy commander.

However, according to information from sources close to the administration of Sevastopol Naval Institute, as of this time approximately 150 cadets have already filed requests with the institute command asking that they be dropped from student rolls. The unpopularity of studying at the institute is due to its protracted reorganization process: since Ukraine lacks a nuclear fleet, the department that trains specialists for nuclear submarines is now oriented toward servicing civilian nuclear facilities, and the training center for the highly important Missile Department was recently relocated from Sevastopol to an unknown location. However, the main reason for cadets leaving is still the lack of prospects: the number of officers in the Ukrainian Navy, which has only five ships, already exceeds the number of available positions many times over.

Reference materials published by the USSR Ministry of Defense Military Education Administration indicate that prior to 1991 the Ukraine had 35 higher military schools. Today their campuses are occupied by various administrations and departments of the newly-established Ministry of Defense. The Kiev newspaper *FORTUNE* quoted Aleksandr Avramenko, a senior scientific associate with the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Scientific Research Institute, who believes that the trend toward changing the mission of military higher educational institutions in Ukraine is resulting in a weakening of Ukraine's defensive capability: “It has become traditional to shut down higher military schools on Ukrainian Independence Day. For example, the Kiev General Forces School was closed on the first anniversary of independence, and by the third anniversary the Kiev VZRIU and the Air Defense Forces Academy had been eliminated—key educational institutions which trained scientific, academic and engineering personnel for the infantry's Air Defense Forces. The USSR's only specialists in that field were trained in Kiev. Courses were

offered there on all types of mobile air defense equipment. There are plans to revive air defense training at a higher educational institution of a different type. The losses that will be incurred as a result of that kind of reorganization are estimated at \$30-50 million. The Air Defense Forces have lost virtually all their instructors and scientists. The Kiev VZRIU is being replaced by a higher educational institution modeled after the Political and Military Department of Kiev Medical University."

Ukraine Leases Black Sea Ships to Pentagon

944F1418A Moscow *SEGODNYA* in Russian
27 Aug 94 p 5

[Article by Yuriy Selivanov under the rubric "Commerce": "Ukraine Sells Soviet Vessels to Pentagon Without Regard for the Economic Interests of Its CIS Partners"]

[Text] Odessa—The Black Sea steamship line, which goes under the name of the Blasko Joint-Stock Concern, is not going through the best of times. The largest shipping company in the former Soviet Union is famous today not so much for its business successes as for the endless confrontation between its former and current administrations, which dragged into its orbit nearly all echelons of power in the Ukrainian state. The atmosphere of anxiety and suspicion that has formed around Blasko does not contribute to the success of the company's operations in the market of international sea shipping, and foreign brokers prefer to deal with more stable partners.

Blasko's leadership is trying to find new nontraditional sources of hard currency. In particular, lately the steamship line has been developing active contacts with the U.S. Defense Department. According to the agreements reached with the Pentagon, one of Blasko's best passenger liners—Ivan Franko—has been leased by the U.S.

Navy and is used as a floating base for the accommodation of Haitian refugees. Currently negotiations are underway on selling the American defense agency four transport gas-turbine vessels of the Atlantika class, which may be used as strategic transports for troops, including tanks and other heavy equipment, over transcontinental distances. Quick transport of armored equipment is precisely why these vessels were needed by the Pentagon, which, as is known, is increasingly actively planning operations on overseas territories.

Blasko's plans to part with powerful gas-turbine vessels, which under conditions of sensible exploitation could still be of considerable utility to Ukraine and other CIS countries, has produced serious worries among the local public. However, the steamship line and other Ukrainian state structures have unequivocal intentions regarding the USSR fleet they inherited. There are currently plans at the stage of preliminary development regarding selling abroad the pride of the former Soviet science research fleet—the Astronaut Yuriy Gagarin and the Academician Sergey Korolev. These vessels had been part of a global telemetry network, which provided continuous communications with and control of piloted spacecraft in orbit. After the disintegration of the Union these expensive vessels, unneeded by Ukraine, sat idly in the outer roads of Odessa harbor, while our astronauts learned the notion of a "blind zone," which means flying over areas of the planet where there are no space communications vessels. On 1 July 1994 Blasko transferred these vessels to the command of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense's space units.

As justification for selling the best ships of the former USSR fleet, the Ukrainian side points out that Ukraine does not need them. What remains unanswered is the question of whether the interests of other CIS countries are heeded in this instance—after all, Ukraine is still a commonwealth member and allegedly even plans to build an economic union with them. So would it not be more correct in the current situation to base decisions on common interests rather than momentary gain?

ARMS TRADE

Farnborough Air Show Presence Deemed Success

MM2609103394 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
20 Sep 94 p 3

[Report by Pavel Bogomolov on interview with Aleksandr Voynov, general director of CIS joint exhibit at Farnborough '94 air show; date and place not given: "Good Show. General Director of CIS Joint Exhibit on Results of Farnborough '94 Air Show"—first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] London—The sectors of the world economy which are currently going through quite a deep structural crisis invariably include aircraft manufacture. Experts are still arguing about the extent to which this depression is linked to the end of the Cold War and the ending of the many years of East-West confrontation not only on land but in the air. They are also arguing about when the long-awaited upturn in the sector will begin—in 1995 or perhaps 1997. But, despite all their current difficulties, aircraft and helicopter manufacturers still rush to their professional shows—be they at Le Bourget or in Singapore or, say, the UAE [United Arab Emirates]. The latest international air show ended the other day in the British town of Farnborough. Has the current sectorial depression been reflected in its stands and static parks, and what did the participation of Russia and its nearest neighbors look like against this background? Aleksandr Voynov, general director of the CIS countries' joint exhibit at Farnborough '94, answered these questions.

Wide-ranging, substantial, and, without any exaggeration, worthy—that was the assessment given to our section of the show by foreign visitors and partners, our interlocutor noted in his interview with PRAVDA. It is very important that joint efforts by "Aviaeksport," the State Committee for the Defense Sectors of Industry, and our colleagues in the near abroad managed to shape a single exhibit by Russia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan, which successfully differed from certain other international exhibits. Analysts with leading world aircraft manufacturers saw this as a sign of the growing unity of the main aims and tasks that are being jointly resolved in a number of the CIS countries by designers of aircraft and space equipment.

Setting off for Farnborough '94, we naturally knew that, owing to well-known global trends, this air show would be more modest than in the past, Voynov continued. For instance, the total number of participants has fallen. The organizers were forced to abandon plans to build several additional rows of the traditional pavilion chalets. But our participation was, on the whole, no less active and representative than it was at the previous show two years ago. The fact that we have a special, historical relationship with Farnborough maybe had an effect. You will recall that it was here, 11 years after the Tu-144 crash in Paris in 1973, that "our star in the world firmament" rose once again and an extensive foreign economic

strategy by the leading collectives in the sector was resumed. And it was in 1988, once again here, that the commercial biography of the famous MiG-29 began.

One way or another, 40 enterprises, organizations, and firms from the CIS countries were represented at the show—an impressive figure, you will agree. We are talking about world-famous aviation complexes, institutes, plants, and the Ilyushin, Tupolev, Mikoyan, Sukhoi, and Antonov Design Bureaus.... Guests visiting our section were particularly interested in promising models of aircraft such as the Il-96 MO and the Tu-204, as well as the excellent Il-114 commuter, the small Il-103 business aircraft, and the Il-76 flying laboratory. The MiG-29 M, the MiG-29 MSE, the Su-27, and its "successor"—the Su-35—graphically demonstrated their considerable combat advantages. In other words, there were a whole string of models of the most modern "overwhelming air-superiority" hardware. Virtually all these aircraft flew demonstrations at Farnborough, which is also of considerable importance. And the Russian Federation Defense Ministry's Military Space Forces successfully offered their launchers to foreign satellite producers.

In general, the general director of the CIS exhibit continued, air shows are not the place where multimillion deals are struck straightaway and "contracts of the century" are signed one after another. But in this instance the Russian delegation was sufficiently high-ranking to discuss and resolve not only technical but fundamental commercial issues of state importance. As a result, Farnborough '94 was marked by positive new agreements on deliveries of major batches of spares through "Aviaeksport" for Soviet and Russian hardware already held abroad. Timely projects which the country very much needs for the conversion of some of our enterprises were agreed and corresponding orders won.

The models represented at the show will be continuing their test programs. These are the Pratt & Whitney-powered Il-96 and the Rolls-Royce-powered Tu-204. We firmly believe in the advantages of such cooperation. It sometimes turns even rivals into close partners in joint programs. Equally, the installation of certain types of Western onboard equipment on Russian aircraft will help our machines meet more quickly the tough navigation demands laid down by the International Civil Aviation Organization.

Considerable reserves have been revealed for promoting even seemingly unexpected products from Russian aircraft manufacturers on the world market. Take, for instance, the relatively small stand occupied by our "Fazatron" firm, which specializes in onboard equipment. It was showing the "Kopye" radar for the judgment of specialists. Do you know what this unit is designed to do? To be retrofitted to MiG-21 fighters—those obsolete "masters of the skies" of the sixties—thereby sharply expanding their combat performance. I will now tell you how many of these machines of

yesteryear remain in service abroad. It turns out that there are still more than 3,000 of them! You can imagine how certain MiG-21 owners would be interested in an inexpensive opportunity to upgrade and modernize these aircraft with "Fazatron's" help.

As a result, the interviewee said in conclusion, this show has confirmed that, despite all our difficulties—and there are plenty of them at the moment—our aircraft manufacturing sector remains at an entirely suitable and acceptable level, and, on the whole, is working normally, with an eye to the future. Entering your new models for Farnborough is an expensive business. People often judge whether the sector in various countries is afloat or not on this basis.

SECURITY SERVICES

Troop Status on Tajik-Afghan Border Viewed

944K2301A *Almaty KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA*
in Russian 8 Sep 94 pp 1, 4

[Article by Valeriy Nikishin, KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA: "In Hours of Calm, 'X'-Hour Comes to Mind; the Campaign in Preparation for the Impending Tajik Presidential Elections Has Evoked a Sharp Reaction of the Opposition Forces"]

[Text] Recently, as is known, a group of deputies of the Supreme Council of the republic visited the deployment sites of Kazakhstani soldiers who are guarding the Tajik-Afghan border as part of the Border Troops of the Russian Federation. The purpose of the trip to the fellow countrymen was: As closely as possible, to learn about the conditions of their service, the provision of food and clothing, and to see, understand, and sense their morale here on the former Union's southern border, which today consists of numerous "hot spots." Without exaggeration—on a battle line.

The reports, travel notes, and sketches of Kazakhstani journalists who took part in this trip are yet to be published and shown on television. Very likely, military specialists of the Border Troops and motorized rifle units and of the Internal Troops of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Kazakhstan will share their observations and comments in the mass media.

But, today, this is what I would like to dwell on. It is said that first impressions are not only the strongest, but also the most correct. However, this truth is not that immutable, and, therefore, we will set aside "strongest" for a time and turn to "correct." Well, let those speak to them who know military affairs and military construction first hand.

And so, a news conference was held in Dushanbe by the leader of the Kazakhstani group of parliamentarians, military specialists, and journalists, Major General Tokhtar Aubakirov, the first cosmonaut of the republic,

and Lieutenant General Anatoliy Chechulin, the commanding general of the contingent of border troops of Russia in Tajikistan.

The discussion with journalists, among whom were representatives not only of Kazakhstan's press, but also of the local, Tajik, and foreign press, was started by Tokhtar Aubakirov. He immediately emphasized that he was expressing the general opinion of the whole group concerning the trip that took place along the border. The deputies broke up into groups in order to visit as many different sectors as possible in order to acquire a more integral picture of the life and service of Kazakhstani troops: Part of them visited the Moscow detachment of the Border Troops of the Russian Federation in Kalai-Khumb, and part—the Khorog detachment. Thus, it was possible to meet almost all of the Kazakhstani subunits and to talk with privates and sergeants and their commanders, including Russians as well.

"It was gratifying to hear and to realize," Tokhtar Aubakirov said, "that our soldiers are performing their duty as they should and that they are carrying out their operational mission conscientiously. Comments about them are the best. There is no unfavorable criticism on the part of local residents who live in the border zone about any kind of improper actions of the servicemen. Moreover, there are no reasons for the emergence of interethnic friction. This also refers to the mutual relations between Russian and Kazakhstani soldiers—they have a common job, which brings them closer and does not divide them."

Tokhtar Aubakirov also noted this important point. At a meeting that was held, the leaders of the Republic of Tajikistan expressed their sincere gratitude to Kazakhstan for the assistance that it is rendering in helping to maintain a "closed" border. After all, if it ends up being open here, this will mean that the borders of all of the Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union will also be open. Who needs new "hot spots?"

Continuing the theme, the people's deputy said that the parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan supports intergovernmental agreements concerning the introduction of a limited contingent of CIS troops in Tajikistan. A draft law is now in the Supreme Council concerning the performance of service by Kazakhstani soldiers beyond the borders of their motherland, in particular, in the performance of their international duty. This draft provides a number of special privileges for servicemen.

Of course, with time, Tajikistan will no longer require peacekeeping forces. It will be able to close the border reliably by itself, but we must help it for the present.

Anatoliy Chechulin, the commanding general of the Border Troops of Russia on the Tajik-Afghan border gave his evaluation of the service of the Kazakhstani soldiers. I have no grounds for somehow separating them and Russians, he said. One and the other have high

combat morale and a very great responsibility. They all fight "as equals boldly, as equals—responsibly, and as equals—professionally."

Indeed, a majority of the Kazakhstani soldiers are at temporary remote posts along the border, and they perform service in a combat guard outpost. But this does not mean that they are particularly deprived of any kind of more comfortable, if this word is applicable to the border, conditions of life. Motorized riflemen or soldiers of the Internal Troops, they, unquestionably, will perform their combat tasks better exactly there where they are located. But in the outposts and in the detachments, about 80 percent of the service is carried out by specialists who maintain the complete viability of these points. For example, electricians, battery operators, radar operators, cooks, etc. It is impossible to remove them from service here even for a short period of time. But, the commanding general noted that in the event of the initiation of combat actions and the outbreak of an armed conflict, Kazakhstani and Russian soldiers stand side by side in the trenches.

Despite the fact that the situation was calm (or it seemed to be calm) on the Tajik-Afghan border in the days of the visit there of guests from Kazakhstan, the question about the true state of affairs continued to arise.

Speaking about the situation, I will not try to reassure anyone, Anatoliy Chechulin said. It continues to be complicated. What is more, the current democratic steps of the Government of Tajikistan, in particular the campaign in preparation for the election of the president of Tajikistan, have aroused a tough reaction from the forces of the opposition, which is being expressed in the most miserable form—in the form of illegal armed actions. The leaders of the opposition understand very well that a decisive moment is arriving, and they are trying in every way possible to disrupt the forthcoming election process by resorting to force. Not only assaults from the other side of the border are used, but also an "underground" that penetrated Tajikistan is drawn into combat actions. But it must also be seen that it is impossible for them to win power. Yes, there are human losses, and there are sectors that have become traditionally threatening. For example, the 12th Outpost. But we reckon that this is only a subsidiary direction for strikes that are being prepared. It is assumed that the main one will go through the Gorno-Badakhshanskaya Oblast. The terrain is more difficult there, and the combat security sectors are more thinly spread out. That is why the No. 1 question is the question of military saturation of the border. So, once again thanks to Kazakhstan, which, like Russia, is carrying out to the fullest extent the obligations it assumed in the defense of our, as before, really common border.

While this material was being prepared, a report came in about combat actions on the Khorog sector of the Tajik-Afghan border. Exactly there where we were just

three to four days ago. Was Lieutenant General Chechulin right? That the calm turned out to be deceptive, and "X"-Hour is building up somewhere behind the closest cliffs on the adjacent side of the border? God grant that this was only dreamt by our countrymen on the distant border. And that the dream went away at dawn...

Almaty-Khorog-Dushanbe-Almaty.

Deputies Visit Troops, Tajik-Afghan Border

944K2286A Almaty SOVETY KAZAKHSTANA
in Russian 7 Sep 94 p 2

[Article by special correspondent Vadim Makhin: "On the Firing Line. Reportage from the Tajik-Afghan Border"]

[Text] Almaty-Dushanbe-Khorog—As was already reported, a group of deputies from the republic Supreme Court headed by Chairman of the Committee on National Security and Defense Tiktak Aubakirov visited the Tajik-Afghan border in the places of deployment of the Kazakhstan battalion that is loyal to the Russian border guards. They were accompanied on the trip by journalists from a number of Almaty newspapers and radio and television companies.

On the Way to Khorog

In the Dushanbe airport we were greeted by a 40-degree temperature. And soldiers in bullet-proof vests with automatic rifles strapped across their chests—a typical feature of modern Tajikistan. The IL-72 aircraft of the Kazakhstan border troops had delivered 1.5 tonnes of humanitarian cargo—cigarettes, candy, and various appurtenances of a simple soldier's life and leisure. They had to be loaded onto helicopters by Russian crews.

Throughout our entire route, because of the smooth interaction between the border guards of Kazakhstan and Russia, there was not a moment of confusion anywhere. Here too, having barely left the airplane, we immediately set off for the helicopter pad. Here the deputies divided into two groups. Toktar Aubakirov and Mukhtar Tinikeyev departed for the little village of Kalay-Khumb. Tatyana Silkina, Deputy Chairman of the Control Chamber Tanirbergen Tokhtarov, and Deputy General Secretary of the CIS Council of the Interparliamentary Assembly Khalel Bakenov went to Khorog, the center of Gorno-Badakhshan.

While the helicopters were being loaded a plane arrived from the Pyandzh border detachment. An ambulance was waiting for it. Doctors in white coats, medics carrying stretchers. A Russian officer had been killed and three Russian border guards severely wounded in night combat. It occurred to me to wonder: "How are our boys doing there? Is everything all right with them?"

The Khorog section of the border, where the Kazakhstan military servicemen are stationed (and this includes

border guards, motorized riflemen, and internal forces) is one of the most dangerous. Incidentally, as the commanders later explained to us, there are no safe areas. There is gunfire along the entire border. It is a rare day when commandos do not try to cross over to Tajikistan territory and back to Afghanistan, when there is no fighting and nobody is engaged in combat. And the Khorog section, where we were headed, is no exception.

An unusual picture opened up before us. Green cotton fields. Ravines with sides eroded by the wind and rain. Clearly visible canals full of water, yellow beds of dried-up rivers, the mirrorlike surface of the Nurek water reservoir. The higher the helicopters climbed, the steeper were the mountains with their bald sides and scanty vegetation in the crevices, and the rarer the valleys with oases where small villages were located. There were precipices and slopes of several hundred meters and frighteningly dark abysses where even on a sunny day the thread of the stream was barely visible.

At an altitude of more than 3,000 meters above sea level we notice white mounds of unmelted snow and ice. The helicopter follows a preset route right in among the immense steep peaks. Pamir is the roof of the world.

One of the deputies remarked:

"Serious mountains."

Indeed—wild, uninhabited places, harsh nature. The Kazakhstan military servicemen had been taken rather far!

When we reached Rushanskiy Pass the altitude according to the instruments was 4,200 meters, and cliffs surrounding us on the left and right seemed to be suspended above the helicopter. The taciturn pilot told us confidently:

"On the right side is Afghanistan."

And with short, simple answers he beat back the onslaught of our questions: "Will we not hit the cliff with our blade? Will there not be gunfire from the Afghan side?"

The newspapermen envy the cameraman who has settled into the pilot's cabin next to the machine gun which is loaded with cartridges, and he continues to shoot more and more film.... His pictures will show the viewer the austerity and grandeur of these parts, but how will our words strike the readers?

When we landed in Khorog it was a warm evening. A cool breeze blew off the Pyandzh River. The wind out of the gorge played with the leaves of the mulberry trees and the pyramidal poplars. It was hard to believe that this peace and quiet was disturbed by gunfire.

The first deputy chairman of the executive committee of Gorno-Badakhshan, Shermakhamed Dekonmamadov, who greeted the deputies, noted not without pride:

"Anyone who comes here for the first time falls in love with the beauty of the region and anyone who lives here a year or two will definitely want to return."

During the time of our journey we were repeatedly convinced of the truthfulness of his words, as we were of the fact that the local residents were respectful and kind to the border guards. In random encounters they were happy to start up conversations and smoke cigarettes. When military personnel go through the villages the children wave to them and the adults give them kind looks. All these are necessary conditions for foreign troops to be stationed on the territory of another state and continuously interact with the local authorities and unit commanders. And a clear example of this kind of interaction was this very visit to the border by members of parliament of another country.

Songs Over the Pyandzh

The next morning the vehicles were already standing there waiting for the deputies and journalists. The military escort included two armored personnel carriers with soldiers on board. Lieutenant Colonel Nikolay Gorbatenko, chief of staff of the troop operations division of the Khorog group of Russian border troops, who had operational command of the Kazakhstan battalion, gave the last orders. And the convoy was on its way.

The turbulent Pyandzh separates Tajikistan from Afghanistan in these places. The river's width in the valleys is 150-200 meters and in the gorges—50, 30, or even less. It is easy to throw a stone to the other side. It is impossible to close off the border throughout its immense distance with outposts and search groups alone. Therefore temporary posts and combat positions have been located at the most probable crossings for commandos.

The first we visited is the village of Barchid. Above the river and the road that runs parallel to it hang high cliffs. By craning my neck I could make out the rocky fortresses and the border guards in camouflage uniforms. They were all wearing helmets and bulletproof vests. We clambered toward them. In places it was so steep that, trying to keep your balance, you would automatically get down on all fours. The soldiers courteously offered their hands. And they were something. After all, they have to take these paths up to their positions every day. And not stripped down but in full combat gear and with a load—food, water, ammunition. A soldier's life is hard!

Up above, on the square in front of the quarters of the deputy commander of the consolidated regiment Capital Nadyr Zharkimbekov, the platoon leader, Lieutenant Zhanat Berimzhanov, and other commanders ordered the soldiers into formation. The members of parliament started to become acquainted with the military servicemen, to ask about their service and their daily life.

In the unanimous opinion of the senior leaders, the company was successfully carrying out its task of

guarding the border. They put a stop to any attempts at illegal crossing by commandos to their section.

A couple of days before we arrived along with the Russian border guards, the Kazakhstan men participated in an operation to disarm 10 Arab mercenaries. The command came: "To battle," and the soldiers occupied their positions. The armed commandos bravely, during the day, rode in a truck in which they had placed women and children to cover them so that they could find a safe place to cross to the other side.

They were stopped here. They were ordered to turn over their weapons. They categorically refused, responding that they would not be taken alive. They were advised to look upward. The cliffs were filled with semicircular steel pots and the barrels of machine guns and automatic weapons were sticking out everywhere. Every movement of the commandos was watched. The consolidated company was prepared to fire for effect.

The negotiations continued for five hours. Finally the commandos gave in. And indeed how could they respond to the argument that was suspended over them! But the soldiers exhibited such restraint and courage. It is hard to say which is easier—fleeting gunfire or long anticipation of battle.

During those same August days a Russian border guard was killed near the village of Barchid. This death left the Kazakhstan men greatly shaken. According to stories from the commanders, they are now firing on targets especially methodically and mercilessly.

People usually do not ask about the losses of the commandos. As a rule, they remove the bodies from the field immediately. Nonetheless, one morning the waves of the Pyandzh brought to the shore the bloated, half-decomposed corpse of a commando. It was turned over to the local residents for burial.

But the deputies were more interested in the conditions for service than the daily life in combat. The Kazakhstan men have been in their positions for more than a month of the three specified by the contract. None have been killed or wounded; they are all in good health. Once a week they take turns going to the outpost for a bath. They do not complain about the food: It is better than in Kalay-Khumba; it is satisfying and tasty. The old cook of the 1st Platoon, Private Saydakhmet Shotkarimov from Pavlodar Oblast, says:

"Our requests are basically fulfilled. We have plenty of cereal—barley, wheat groats. We have butter and sunflower oil. They bring in eggs and juices."

"But what about fruits and vegetables?"

"Now there are apples and tomatoes. In reserve we have onions, cabbage, and cucumbers."

There are complaints about the bread—it is moist and not baked through. But as the commander of the Khorog group of border forces assured us, they are preparing to

put two additional ovens into operation and high-quality bread will be delivered to the position continuously.

The provision of housing is not so good. There are no sticks or straw, and the military servicemen live in rock shelters and dugouts. Instead of a roof they have a tarp. They sleep on stones in sleeping bags. But, after all, winter will soon be here. Rain and freezing weather. You cannot protect yourself from the cold under a tarp. And the proper warm clothing has not been provided yet. Like the camouflage nets for the helmets. And without them on a moonlit night the shining heads of the soldiers can be seen for hundreds of meters.

There is a problem with footwear. The shoes that are made in Kazakhstan will not last even two or three weeks on the sharp rocks. The heels come off and the sole tears. And what comes after that—bloody feet? Torn footwear is more than just degrading to the fighting man. It means poor maneuverability and a great probability of death in combat. Both the commanders and the soldiers unanimously asked the deputies to help them solve all these problems.

I went up to a group of military men. Privates Zhenis Baydalosov and Yerkin Berkutov from Semipalatinsk Oblast and Yerbolat Bupebayev from Taldy-Korgan had remained for a second tour in spite of all the difficulties and vicissitudes of the service. Also included here are Sergeant Usmangali Nurshayev from Pavlodar Oblast and Private Nurlan Syzdykov from Kustanay Oblast. The boys are bothered by the fact that the mail service is so poor (something else for the deputies to take care of). They send letters and do not know whether they reach their destination or not. There is no news from home.

I asked one of the soldiers if he had a girlfriend at home? What should I tell her through the newspaper? In response I received a storm of orders and requests.

"Everyone has a girlfriend. Write that we remember them."

"Tell them to wait for us."

"Do not forget about my brother and sister."

"And tell my parents that things are going all right in the service. Tell them not to worry..."

On that same day we visited the position of the 3d Platoon of the same consolidated company. Here we noted the conscientious service of Junior Sergeant Andrey Medvedev from Kokshetau Oblast and Private Sergey Pakhilo from Akmola Oblast.

A military feat was accomplished by the enlisted men staff machine gunner Amantay Rakhmetov and his assistant Kanat Idrisov. One night when an illuminating mortar shell hung on a parachute over the Pyandzh he noticed that some commandos were trying to swim across to Tajikistan territory. He opened fire on command. The rounds were fired evenly and he shot cold-bloodedly. The crossing of the mujahidin was stopped.

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Later in the combat report they noted that the target was hit and 400 rounds were fired.

And this detail did not escape the gaze of the guests either: a twanging guitar in the rock shelter. And a request came immediately from Tatyana Silkina: "Play something."

The section commander Junior Sergeant Arman Gabasov from Kokshetau Oblast placed his fingers on the strings. The melodies that poured out were about their native steppe region, the Kazakh land. It seemed that the turbulent Pyandzh calmed down for a moment and the mountains listened. The soldiers' faces brightened up.

Then Senior Lieutenant Valeriy Lysenko, the deputy company commander, took the guitar. He had a different repertoire: the hard life of the border guards today. Many people in the battalion write verses and compose melodies. The lines from a new song seemed so immediate and comprehensible:

Here we have become friends forever

Like front-line brothers.

The parliamentary delegation traveled more than 100 kilometers along the fiery border. And everywhere there were contrasts: high mountains and deep ravines, dead silence during the day and bright bursts of machine gun fire at night, the militant mood of the military servicemen and the poverty of their daily life.

One must not fail to note one more important circumstance. The joint-stock companies KRAMDS, Kazkontrakt, and Meroy and the joint Kazakhstan-British company helped to obtain humanitarian aid for the Kazakhstan battalion. Without their participation the trip of the members of parliament would not have been so successful.

One of the last meetings on the border, at the Anderob outpost, where Russians and Kazakstanis serve together, came to mind. Among the gifts the delegation gave to the military servicemen there was a domra mandolin. They were glad to get it. The guests were asked to come back in a month, to a concert with domra players.

The greeting was hearty and the farewell was moving. The words of a soldiers' song heard here, on the Pyandzh, came to mind:

Leaving brings me to tears

Border outpost

"We Are Needed Here!"

No matter what the deputies talked about with the military servicemen, one way or another the subject

came around to the purpose of their being there. Why are they here, these people from Kazakhstan? There were various answers but they boiled down to what was said simply and intelligibly by an enlisted man of the 3d Platoon of the consolidated company, Nurzhan Ibramov:

"We are obligated to help the Tajiks. We are protecting their homes. And we are also protecting our own fatherland."

Almost all the fighting men we met during these days clearly understand that in Tajikistan they are fulfilling an international commitment made by Kazakhstan that on the turbulent Pyandzh they would help to stop the strong flow of drugs and weapons which, if not stopped, will make their way from the mountains of Pamir to the streets of our cities and villages.

Now is the most difficult time. During 1981-1982 as a specialist I had occasion to work in Afghanistan, and I know first hand that in the fall until the crossing is covered with snow the organized gangs are especially active, bold, and cruel.

At a news conference organized in Dushanbe by the Kazakhstan parliament members regarding the results of their journey to the border, the group commander of Russia's border forces in Tajikistan, Lieutenant General Anatoliy Chechulin, noted other peculiarities of this autumn as well. The democratic processes in this republic and the forthcoming presidential elections have evoked an inappropriate reaction from the opposition. Trying to seize political power, they are directing their efforts toward expansion of the crossing of commandos from Afghanistan and activation of the local military underground.

Members of the Kazakhstan parliament are now concerned about improving the conditions for the service of Kazakhstan's men and the creation of an effective mechanism for social protection both of the military servicemen themselves and of their family members. Documents have been prepared and proposals have been made for detailed study of all issues raised at the border along with the corresponding structures, ministries, and departments.

Take, for example, the Kazakhstan insignia. A year ago Tatyana Sidkina, when visiting the Moscow and Pyandzh border detachment, drew attention to the fact that the uniforms of neither the Russian nor the Kazakhstan military servicemen had any state insignia. At that time she made a suggestion to the chief of the Main Staff of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Kazakhstan. They promised to help. And what happened. Now the Russian border guards have their own insignia. But what about ours? They had none and they still have none.

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The corresponding resolution of our republic's Cabinet of Ministers is still not being fully implemented, particularly with regard to pay for military servicemen. Enlisted men and noncommissioned officers of the consolidated company who have remained in Tajikistan for a second tour have complained that instead of 15,000 tenge, which they are supposed to receive according to the contract, they have received only 3,500. The men from Shymkent have not received anything. Is this not a repetition of the "Afghan variant," whereby the boys were sent to a foreign country to the sound of bullets, and then, crippled and broken, they met with bureaucratic indifference at home?

At a Dushanbe news conference Toktar Aubakirov firmly stated:

"We must not allow a repeat of Afghanistan."

His meetings with the head of Tajikistan, Emomali Rakhmonov, and the commanders of the group of border forces confirmed that the members of the Kazakhstan parliament are doing everything in their power to make sure that our men on the border are provided with everything they need and are socially protected.

"We are needed here!" the deputies were told repeatedly by the men from Kazakhstan on the shores of the Pyandzh. They are doing their duty, which is shown by the gratitude expressed to them by the leaders of Tajikistan and the troop commanders. The government and the corresponding power structures of our republic must keep their commitments to them.

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